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Irresolute Testators, Clear and 
Convincing Wills Law 
Jane B. Baron* 
Abstract 
Controversial recent wills law reforms, embodied in new 
provisions of both the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement 
of Property, excuse so-called harmless errors in will execution and 
permit judicial correction of erroneous terms in a will or trust. 
Both reforms pose evidentiary dangers, as proof of the error must 
come from outside the attested instrument and will be offered after 
the testator’s death. To respond to this concern, both the error and 
the testator’s true intent must be established by “clear and 
convincing” evidence.  
This Article is the first to examine how courts have applied 
the clear and convincing evidence standard to these important 
reforms of wills law. In practice, the clear and convincing evidence 
standard provides less evidentiary protection than its proponents 
expected. More importantly, judicial struggles with the clear and 
convincing evidence standard expose a deep fissure in the very 
concept of testamentary freedom.  
The reforms assume—as does the Wills Act itself—a fully 
formed, fixed set of choices that the testator has sought to express 
in his will, choices made by a conventionally rational choosing 
testamentary self for whom wills rules further self-determined 
ends. This conventionally rational testator makes only innocent, 
inconsequential errors. Many of the testators in the actual cases, 
however, display only bounded rationality. Their errors are not 
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simple accidental snafus. While the reforms contemplate 
correction only of the technical, innocuous expression or execution 
errors made by self-reliant, choosing testamentary selves, at least 
some courts care also about the more complicated errors made by 
vulnerable, irresolute testamentary selves. These courts push 
against the reforms’ boundaries. The clear and convincing 
evidence standard has not and will not function as a serious limit 
on mistake correction because it fails to reckon with both visions of 
testamentary freedom.  
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I. Introduction 
The musty law of wills has been substantially refurbished 
over the last half century to solve a recurring problem. It has long 
been clear that the formal requirements governing will execution 
have the capacity to defeat the very intent they were designed to 
further. Small, inconsequential errors in signing or witnessing a 
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will can lead to the invalidation of the document, even where the 
court is confident that the decedent intended the document to 
serve as his will.1 The first wave of wills law reform sought to 
solve this problem by reducing the number of required 
formalities.2 A second and more controversial wave of reform, 
embodied in new provisions added to both the Uniform Probate 
Code (UPC)3 and the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and 
Donative Transfers (Restatement),4 sought to solve the problem 
differently, by excusing “harmless errors” in will execution if 
“clear and convincing” evidence shows that the decedent intended 
the document to be a will.5 
The will execution reform was quickly followed by another 
reform permitting judicial correction of erroneous terms in a will 
or trust. This mistake correction reform departed starkly from 
prior law that generally excluded extrinsic evidence of the 
testator’s intent if the words of the will or trust were 
                                                                                                     
 1. I use the male pronoun throughout this Article to avoid any suggestion 
that male testators are resolute and female testators irresolute. 
 2. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2 pt. 5 gen. cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) 
(“The basic intent of these sections is to validate the will whenever possible. To 
this end . . . formalities for a written and attested will are kept to a minimum.”). 
 3. UNIF. PROBATE CODE (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). 
 4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
(AM. LAW INST. 2015).  
 5. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013) (validating an improperly executed document if clear and convincing 
evidence establishes that the decedent intended the document to be his will); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2015) (“A harmless error in executing a will may be excused if the 
proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent 
adopted the document as his or her will.”). These reforms are explained infra 
Part II.A. On the importance of—and the controversy surrounding—these 
reforms, see Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate 
Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 855, 877 (2012) [hereinafter Kelly, Toward 
Economic Analysis] (describing the harmless error rule as a “significant 
development”); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 235, 279 (1996) (describing UPC section 2-503 as a “revolutionary 
change”); James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1009 
(1992) (describing the UPC execution reforms as a “big step” in reconciling the 
law of wills and contracts); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial 
Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform 
Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 
FLA. L. REV. 599, 601 (1991) (describing UPC section 2-503 as a “major 
innovation”). 
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unambiguous.6 Before allowing reformation of the text of 
donative documents, the revised UPC and Restatement require 
clear and convincing evidence both of the mistake in the 
document’s existing terms and of the testator’s true intent.7 
This Article is the first to examine how courts are applying 
the clear and convincing evidence standard to these important 
reforms of wills law.8 In practice, the clear and convincing 
                                                                                                     
 6. On the prior law, see infra Part II.B (describing the historical practice 
of excluding extrinsic evidence because of the unavailability of the testator). 
 7. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument . . . if it is 
proved by clear and convincing evidence what the transferor’s intention was and 
that the terms of the governing instrument were affected by a mistake of fact or 
law . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“A donative document . . . may be reformed . . . if it 
is established by clear and convincing evidence[:] (1) that a mistake of fact or 
law . . . affected specific terms of the document; and (2) what the donor’s 
intention was.”). These reforms are explained infra Part II.A.  
 8. Prior commentary has focused mainly on the wisdom of excusing clear 
errors and on the experiences of the countries that adopted the will execution 
reform ahead of the United States, with particular attention paid to whether the 
reforms have created a slippery slope problem of habitual noncompliance with 
Wills Act requirements. See, e.g., Wayne M. Gazur, Coming to Terms with the 
Uniform Probate Code’s Reformation of Wills, 64 S.C. L. REV. 403, 420 (2012) 
(suggesting that the reformation reform will add to estate litigation); Stephanie 
Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence 
for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 
583 (2007) (examining how the harmless error rule and substantial compliance 
fared in Australia from 1987–2007); Miller, supra note 5, at 705 (arguing that 
the harmless error rule will compromise existing limits on the issues to be 
resolved after the testator’s death); John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How 
Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 73, 80 (2008) 
(tracing how the slippery slope of relaxing formalities to determine 
testamentary intent, without more guidance than “do the right thing,” creates a 
new avenue for judicial activism).  
There is one exception to this line of commentary. In 2002, when both UPC 
section 2-503 and Restatement section 3.3 were relatively new, Emily Sherwin 
argued that “the true function of the clear and convincing evidence standard is 
to give the appearance of a compromise, when in fact a choice has been made in 
favor of fact-sensitive adjudication and against determinate formality rules.” 
Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The 
Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. 
L. REV. 453, 474 (2002). Sherwin’s direct concern, however, was not wills law 
particularly but legal formality generally, with the UPC harmless error rule 
serving merely as an example of the impossibility of a position intermediate 
between formalism and case-by-case evaluation of intent. Id. at 460. She 
considered the potential effectiveness of the will execution reform only as a 
logical and theoretical matter and did not purport to examine how the reform 
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evidence standard provides less evidentiary protection than its 
proponents expected. Nor has it functioned as apparently 
intended to cabin the reforms to a narrow range of technical 
mistakes in execution or expression.  
The courts’ struggles with the clear and convincing evidence 
standard expose a fissure in the concept of testamentary freedom. 
The reforms assume—as does the Wills Act9 itself—a fully 
formed, fixed set of choices that the testator means to express in 
his will. For a testator with such intent, the will functions as a 
“safe harbor,”10 in which his wishes are protected against the 
unreliable statements of others and his own potential 
ill-considered changes of mind. The safe harbor contemplates a 
coldly rational, choosing testamentary self for whom wills rules 
are a means for furthering self-determined ends. The reforms 
contemplate correction only of technical, innocuous errors in the 
expression or execution of that testator’s intent. 
But many of the testators in the cases do not seem to 
correspond to the model underlying the Wills Act and the 
reforms. These testators cannot bring themselves to make the 
final decisions about their property that the Wills Act rules are 
meant to effectuate or, if they do, they change their minds.11 
Their errors are not the simple technical snafus the reforms 
appear to contemplate. Nevertheless, courts work hard to fit 
them under the reform provisions. These efforts are consistent 
with other wills rules which envision and protect more emotional, 
ambivalent testators—testators who, for example, fail to take 
                                                                                                     
actually functions in the courts. See generally id. 
 9. The term “Wills Act” refers generically to the probate code provisions 
prescribing rules for making a valid will. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. 
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 147 (9th ed. 2013) (“The probate code of 
every state includes a provision . . . which prescribes rules for making a valid 
will.”).  
 10. See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of 
Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors] (“The 
greatest blessing of the Wills Act formalities is the safe harbor that they 
create. . . . The testator who complies with Wills Act formalities assures his 
estate of routine probate in all but exceptional circumstances.”). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Estate of Windham, No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1–
2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (per curiam) (describing a testator who initially 
devised her estate to her son and then in weeks before her death, lined out her 
son’s name on a copy of the will and wrote in her daughter’s name). 
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care in expressing themselves or to update their wills. Both 
testators are a part of wills law. The clear and convincing 
evidence standard addresses only the technical errors of the 
self-reliant choosing testamentary self. But at least some courts 
care also about the more complicated errors of the vulnerable, 
irresolute testamentary self. These courts push against the 
reforms’ boundaries. As a result, the clear and convincing 
evidence standard has not, and will not, function as a serious 
limit on mistake correction. 
Part II examines the development of the will execution and 
mistake correction reforms in wills law. The trajectory of this 
history, from “substantial compliance” to “harmless error,” is 
well-established. What has not been sufficiently appreciated is 
the role of a heightened evidentiary standard in the development 
of the reforms. The reforms were never meant to displace the 
view of will-making inherent in the Wills Act itself, which 
assumes a finalized testamentary intent of which unambiguous 
evidence can be found. Part III details the courts’ application of 
the clear and convincing evidence standard, demonstrating how 
much less protection the standard offers than might be expected. 
This problem may have less to do with the courts than with the 
testators themselves, whose will-making practices reflect a much 
less determinate intent than the Wills Act and the reforms 
envision. Part IV explores whether and why it matters that the 
clear and convincing evidence standard does not function as its 
proponents anticipated. It argues that wills law recognizes two 
discordant versions of testamentary freedom, one envisioning a 
conventionally rational testator capable of once-and-for-all 
decision making and the other envisioning a testator whose 
rationality is noticeably bounded and whose choices are much 
more tentative. A true reform of wills law would encompass both 
of these visions. 
II. Evidence and the Harmless Error/Mistake Correction Reforms 
This Part contextualizes the will execution and mistake 
correction reforms, explaining their place in the range of efforts to 
deal with execution and expression errors. The reforms address 
directly what makes wills errors so difficult to correct—the 
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potential unreliability of the evidence of mistake.12 The clear and 
convincing evidence standard was built into the reforms in 
response to this evidentiary problem. However, the strategy of 
requiring clear and convincing evidence shares the assumption of 
earlier strategies that testators have a fixed and final intent that 
they mean to state once and for all in their wills. 
A. The Case for Excusing Harmless Errors 
The new execution and mistake correction reforms address 
an old problem. The formalities of the Wills Act have long been 
thought to perform intent-effectuating functions.13 They are said 
to provide a ritual, cautioning testators that their acts should be 
taken seriously,14 to produce reliable evidence of testators’ 
wishes,15 to protect testators (in the case of nonholographic wills) 
from fraud, undue influence or other forms of pressure,16 and to 
channel testators into forms of expression easily recognized by 
courts as wills.17 Similarly, the rules prohibiting correction of 
                                                                                                     
 12. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 147 (“The witness who is 
best able to authenticate the will . . . and to clarify the meaning if its terms is 
dead by the time the court considers such issues.”). 
 13. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of 
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (1941) (explaining the function of wills 
formalities in convincing the court of the testator’s deliberate and final intent to 
effectuate a transfer).  
 14. See id. at 4 (“The formalities of transfer generally require the 
performance of some ceremonial for the purpose of impressing the transferor 
with the significance of his statements . . . . This purpose of the requirements of 
transfer may conveniently be termed their ritual function.”). 
 15. See id. (explaining that formalities may increase the reliability of proof, 
counteracting inaccurate oral testimony and the unavailability of the main 
actor). 
 16. See id. at 4–5 (“[T]he . . . prophylactic purpose of safeguarding the 
testator . . . [is] the protective function.”). 
 17. The first three functions derive from Gulliver & Tilson. Id. John H. 
Langbein added the fourth, channeling, function to this canonical listing in his 
article Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act [hereinafter Langbein, 
Substantial Compliance], 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975). See id. at 493–94 
(invoking the “channeling” function of contract law to explain the purpose of the 
Wills Act formalities). 
I have argued elsewhere that these functions were not of primary concern in 
the adoption of the Wills Act, and that there is reason to question the 
understanding of human behavior that underlies the functional justification of 
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mistaken terms are thought to protect against the dangers of 
potentially unreliable extrinsic evidence.18 Yet, however well 
those rules might work for the well-advised and well-represented 
testators who follow them, the reported cases show that at least 
some testators whose intentions are undisputed fail to comply 
with them in some respect or another.19 These testators sign 
outside the presence or sight of the witnesses,20 or they have their 
will witnessed by only one of two required witnesses,21 or they 
place their signature somewhere other than at the “end” or “foot” 
of the will,22 and so forth. For these testators, the rules are not 
intent-effectuating, but intent-defeating because “once a formal 
defect [in execution] is found, Anglo-American courts have been 
unanimous in concluding that the attempted will fails.”23 
                                                                                                     
form. See generally Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 
(1988–89). 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining prior law barring 
reformation and explaining that “[r]eforming a will, it was feared, would often 
require inserting language that was not executed in accordance with the 
statutory formalities”). On the “plain meaning” or “no extrinsic evidence” rule, 
see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 328 (“[A] majority of states 
follow . . . two rules that, operating in tandem, bar admission of extrinsic 
evidence to vary the terms of a will. [T]he plain meaning of the words of a will 
cannot by disturbed by evidence that the testator intended another 
meaning . . . . [C]ourts may not reform a will to correct a mistaken term . . . .”). 
See also 1-5 Schoenblum, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 5.16 (LexisNexis 
Matthew Bender 2015) (explaining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to 
contradict the terms of a will). For a critique of the plain meaning rule, see Jane 
B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 656–57 (1992) 
(advocating a storytelling approach to will interpretation). 
 19. See, e.g., In re Groffman, [1969] All E.R. 108 (Eng.) (declining probate 
to a document the court was “perfectly satisfied” was intended as the testator’s 
will because the two witnesses were not present at the same time at execution, 
as required by the statute). 
 20. See e.g., In re Estate of Berg, No. 268584, 2006 WL 2482895, at *2–3 
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006) (describing how Berg signed out of sight of one of 
the two required witnesses). 
 21.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1135–36 (Mont. 2002) 
(explaining that the will was signed by only one witness where the execution 
statute required two). 
 22. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 149 (explaining how the 
original Wills Act of 1837 required the will to be signed “at the foot or end 
thereof,” known generally as subscription). 
 23. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 489; see also id. at 
498 (“[W]hat is peculiar about the law of wills is not the prominence of the 
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One response to the problem of the rules’ intent defeating 
potential is to ignore it. This is the approach of courts that 
require strict compliance with the Wills Act and that exclude 
extrinsic evidence in cases where unambiguous wills contain 
mistaken terms.24 From an institutional perspective, this is a safe 
choice. Especially with respect to Wills Act formalities, it is not 
clear that courts have authority to deviate from legislatively 
specified will execution requirements.25 On the other hand, the 
strict compliance approach does nothing to further wills law’s 
objective of furthering freedom of disposition.26 And it allows 
much unjust enrichment of unintended beneficiaries.27 
A second way to address the problem is simply to reduce the 
number of formalities required for due execution. This was the 
strategy adopted in the 1969 UPC.28 Gone, for example, was the 
                                                                                                     
formalities, but the judicial insistence that any defect in complying with them 
automatically and inevitably voids the will.”). Note, however, that “there is 
considerable diversity and contradiction in the cases interpreting what acts 
constitute compliance with what formalities.” Id. Courts can reduce the impact 
of the automatic-invalidity rule and of the strict compliance approach simply by 
straining to find that the will’s execution did in fact comply with the applicable 
requirements. 
 24. But see generally Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 
88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597 (2014) (arguing that the formalities and the strict 
compliance rule have different purposes). 
 25. See Sherwin, supra note 8, at 458 (noting, with respect to the 
substantial compliance doctrine, that “the source of courts’ authority to 
disregard the literal terms of the will statutes was left unclear”); see also 
Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 6 (“The substantial 
compliance doctrine is the only avenue open to the courts without legislative 
intervention.”); see also Litevich v. Prob. Court, Dist. of W. Haven, No. 
NNHCV126031579S, 2013 WL 2945055, at *16 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 17, 2013) 
(declining to adopt the harmless error rule as a “judicial gloss” to the 
Connecticut statute prescribing requirements for a valid will). 
 26. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“[T]he organizing principle of 
the American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition. Property 
owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they 
please.”). 
 27.  On the problem of unjust enrichment, see infra note 344 and 
accompanying text. 
 28. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, intro. pt. 5 gen. cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1969) (“If the will is to be restored to its role as the major instrument for 
disposition of wealth at death, its execution must be kept simple.”); see also 
Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 
70’s, 2 CONN. L. REV. 453, 453 (1970) (describing the UPC’s drafting process). 
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requirement that a will be signed “at the end,” or that the 
witnesses be “present at the same time” when the testator signed 
or acknowledged the will.29 The fewer the formalities required, 
the lower the number of wills invalidated on purely technical 
grounds, where the testator’s intent will be defeated due to 
inadvertent, inconsequential execution errors. But for wills that 
failed to comply with the relaxed requirements of the 1969 UPC, 
the automatic invalidity rule held fast, raising the same issues as 
arose under the prior strict compliance approach.30  
To solve this problem, John Langbein proposed, in a 
ground-breaking article published in 1975, an entirely different 
way to avoid unfortunate outcomes: the doctrine of “substantial 
compliance.”31 Under this doctrine, the finding of a formal defect 
would not lead to automatic invalidity, but rather to a further 
inquiry: “[D]oes the noncomplying document express the 
decedent’s testamentary intent, and does its form sufficiently 
approximate Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude 
that it serves the purposes of the Wills Act?”32 If, in a case of 
improper execution, the functions of the relevant formalities were 
satisfied, Langbein argued that the will should be admitted to 
probate notwithstanding the technical error.33 
However, in 1987, after studying experience with statutory 
reforms in Australia, Langbein moved in an altogether different 
                                                                                                     
 29. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013) (requiring only the testator’s signature and the signature of two witnesses 
for a formal will execution); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt. (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1969) (“The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been 
reduced to a minimum . . . . The intent is to validate wills which meet the 
minimal formalities of the statute.”).  
 30. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 510 
(comparing a “rule of reduced formalism” to the UPC approach which “reduce[s] 
the number of required formalities,” but noting “although both techniques work 
generally in the same direction, they will produce different results in many 
cases if the UPC’s ‘minimal formalities’ are to be enforced with the same 
literalism as before”); see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1011 (“The approach of 
the Uniform Probate Code from 1969 to 1980 was to reduce will formalities, but 
to require strict compliance with those formalities.”). 
 31. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 489 (insisting 
that the formalism of wills law is “mistaken and needless”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 515–16 (“[T]he substantial compliance doctrine would admit 
to probate a noncomplying instrument that the court determined was meant as 
a will and whose form satisfied the purposes of the Wills Act.”). 
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direction.34 Rather than seeking to ascertain whether the 
functions of form had been met on the facts, as was required 
under the substantial compliance doctrine, Langbein proposed 
instead that any and all compliance errors be excused entirely if 
the testator’s intent that the document constitute his will is 
proven to a high degree of confidence. Under this new harmless 
error proposal, the extent to which an instrument’s form 
“approximate[s]” Wills Act requirements is entirely immaterial as 
long as the evidence that the testator intended the document as 
his will is otherwise convincingly clear. UPC section 2-503 and 
Restatement section 3.3 alike adopt this approach. Section 2-503 
of the 2010 UPC provides that a document not executed in 
compliance with the provisions of the Wills Act may nonetheless 
be treated as a will if it is established by clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent intended the writing to constitute his 
or her will.35 Restatement section 3.3, promulgated a few years 
later, provides that “a harmless error in executing a will may be 
excused if the proponent establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent adopted the document as his or her 
will.”36 
                                                                                                     
 34. See generally Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10. 
 35. UPC section 2-503’s “dispensing power” extends to formally-flawed 
efforts to revoke, amend, or revive a will. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 
(amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) 
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not 
executed in compliance with Section 2-502 [stating requirements for 
valid will execution], the document or writing is treated as if it had 
been executed with that section if the proponent of the document or 
writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the 
decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: 
(1) the decedent’s will 
(2) a partial or complete revocation of the will, 
(3) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or 
(4) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] 
formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked 
potion of the will. 
 36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The reasons for preferring the harmless error 
approach to the substantial compliance approach have been frequently 
rehearsed. Langbein found that the courts purporting to apply the substantial 
compliance approach tended not to focus, as the doctrine intended, on whether 
the defect in question was “harmless to the statutory purpose.” Langbein, 
Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 531. Instead, the courts asked 
whether the testator’s compliance was “near perfect.” See Langbein, Excusing 
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Toward the end of his article proposing the harmless error 
reform, Langbein noted that “the development of a statutory 
remedy to cure mistakes in complying with execution formalities 
invites consideration of the parallel . . . problem of mistakes in 
content,”37 such as dropped paragraphs or misdescribed devisees. 
In accordance with an earlier proposal made in an article 
co-authored with Lawrence Waggoner,38 Langbein argued that in 
the mistaken term context as in the execution context, the law 
should be prepared to correct the error if the error is proved to a 
high degree of certainty.39 UPC section 2-805 and Restatement 
section 12.1, adopted in the 2008 and 2003 respectively, reflect 
this approach, permitting reformation to conform the testator’s 
document to reflect his intention if both the mistake and the 
intention are proved by “clear and convincing evidence.”40 In 
                                                                                                     
Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 53 (“[T]he courts read into their substantial 
compliance doctrine a near-miss standard, ignoring the central issue of whether 
the testator’s conduct evidenced testamentary intent.”). Meanwhile, the power 
to excuse harmless errors, which was applied far more often to attestation 
mistakes than those involving writing or signature, brought the formal law of 
wills into proper “alignment” with the law of will substitutes, where writing and 
signature are virtually indispensable, but attestation uncommon. Id. at 52–53. 
The reform also made sense in the context of wills law itself, making the 
presumption of invalidity applicable to defectively executed wills rebuttable 
rather than conclusive. Id. at 53. Finally, the Australian experience showed that 
there was no need to fear that open acknowledgment and correction of execution 
errors would somehow open a floodgate of litigation. See id. at 51 (“[T]he 
litigation levels have been astonishingly low.”). 
 37. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 53. 
 38. See generally John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation 
of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 521 (1982) [hereinafter Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills]. 
 39. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 53 (“And 
the standard of proof should be pitched below that of criminal law but above 
that of ordinary civil litigation—in American parlance, clear and convincing 
evidence.”). 
 40. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013)  
The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument, even if 
ambiguous, to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is 
proved by clear and convincing evidence what the transferor’s 
intention was and that the terms of the governing instrument were 
affected by a mistake or fact or law, whether in expression or 
inducement. 
The Restatement provides:  
A donative document, though unambiguous, may be reformed to 
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combination, the execution and mistake correction reforms reject 
the “relentless formalism” of the older law of wills.41 
B. The Evidentiary Problem 
This history of reform is fairly well established. What has not 
been previously appreciated, however, is the extent to which a 
higher than normal standard of proof—the clear and convincing 
evidence standard—has been integral to the reforms from the 
start. As we have seen, prior law held that, even under the more 
relaxed rules of the 1969 UPC, mistakes in execution 
automatically invalidated a will and mistaken terms could not be 
corrected. The danger involved in correcting both kinds of 
mistakes is evidentiary. Proof of the error and of the testator’s 
intent must come from outside the attested will and will be 
offered when the testator is incapable of clarifying, correcting, or 
contradicting the unreliable statements of the living.42 The 
reforms’ response is to require more and better evidence—
evidence that is “clear and convincing.” 
The evidentiary problem has long been clear. Gulliver and 
Tilson’s “classic”43 explanation of why the requirements for will 
execution are formal begins by depicting an evidentiary dilemma: 
                                                                                                     
conform the text to the donor’s intention if it is established by clear 
and convincing evidence (1) that a mistake of fact or law, whether in 
expression or inducement, affected specific terms of the document; 
and (2) what the donor’s intent was. In determining whether these 
elements have been established by clear and convincing evidence, 
direct evidence of intention contradicting the plain meaning of the 
text as well as other evidence of intention may be considered. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2015). The concept of these reforms originated in section 415 of the 
Uniform Trust Code. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (amended 2005) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2014); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2010) (“Added in 2008, Section 2-805 is based on Section 415 of the Uniform 
Trust Code, which in turn was based on Section 12.1 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (2003).”); see Gazur, supra note 
8, at 409–10 (describing the development of the reforms). 
 41. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 489. 
 42. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 147 (“The witness who is 
best able to authenticate the will . . . and to clarify the meaning of its terms is 
dead by the time the court considers such issues.”). 
 43. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 492. 
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“If all transfers were required to be made before the court 
determining their validity,” they wrote, “it is probable that no 
formalities except oral declarations in the presence of the court 
would be necessary” because the court “could observe the 
transferor, hear his statements, and clear up ambiguities by 
appropriate questions.”44 But transfers are not made before 
courts, and this is why the law imposes “requirements of transfer 
beyond evidence of oral statements of intent.”45 Langbein made a 
similar point about evidence, observing that “the ‘chief 
justification’ for the Wills Act formalities . . . is that the testator 
must inevitably be unavailable at the time of litigation to 
authenticate or clarify his intention. This factor justifies the 
formalities.”46 
As noted earlier, the formalities are potentially 
intent-effectuating, serving ritual, evidentiary, protective, and 
channeling functions.47 While the functions of formality are 
intimately connected because “whatever tends to accomplish one 
of these purposes will also tend to accomplish the [others],”48 
some of these functions were considered more important than 
others from the start. For example, even as Gulliver and Tilson 
identified the protective function of attestation, they sharply 
criticized its necessity and effectiveness.49 The 1969 UPC’s 
elimination of prior requirements that the testator publish the 
will, that the witnesses sign in the testator’s presence, that the 
will be signed at “the end,” and that the witnesses be 
disinterested,50 all “markedly weakened the ceremonial value of 
                                                                                                     
 44. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 13, at 3. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 501. 
 47. Supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2015) (“Four discrete functions have been attributed to the formalities—
the evidentiary, cautionary, protective, and channeling functions.”).  
 48. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 497 (quoting Lon 
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 803 (1941)). 
 49. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 13, at 9–10 (asserting that the 
protective function “is difficult to justify under modern conditions”). 
 50. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) 
(dispensing with the formalities of publishing, signing at the foot of the 
instrument, and signing in the presence of attesting witnesses). 
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attestation.”51 From this, Langbein concluded that “the Code’s 
requirements for attested wills suggest that it is primarily the 
evidentiary and channeling purposes of the Wills Act which 
survive in modern times.”52 Of these two, Langbein had no 
trouble concluding that the evidentiary function is “primary.”53 
But if the evidentiary function of form matters, then any 
relaxation of formal requirements is potentially worrisome, as it 
reduces the certainty that the instrument in question reliably 
evidences the testator’s intent.54 Langbein was attentive to this 
concern when he proposed the substantial compliance reform, 
assuring readers that the two most important evidentiary 
safeguards, a writing and a signature, would not be threatened 
under his new approach.55 “A will with the testator’s signature 
omitted does not substantially comply with the Wills Act because 
it leaves in doubt . . . the formation of testamentary intent, 
deliberate and evidenced.”56 Similarly, “the substantial 
compliance doctrine would have no practical effect on the 
requirement that wills be in writing. Written terms, written 
signature, and—where mandated—written attestation comprise a 
group of formalities whose omission could scarcely be 
insubstantial.”57 Because writing and signature requirements 
were indispensable under the substantial compliance approach, 
the quality and quantity of evidence of the testator’s intent would 
necessarily be high.58 
                                                                                                     
 51. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 511. 
 52. Id.  
 53. See id. at 492 (“The primary purpose of the Wills Act has always been 
to provide the court with reliable evidence of testamentary intent and of the 
terms of the will.”); see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1027 (“In the law of wills 
the overriding fear is that unattested language will be used to pass property at 
death.”).  
 54. See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 579 
(explaining that the no-reformation rule responded to “the difficulty and danger 
of proving that a testator now dead made a mistake in his duly executed will”). 
 55. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 518 (“Our 
courts rely upon signatures as the most important evidence of finality of 
intention. . . . Signature is also the primary evidence of the will’s authenticity.”). 
 56. Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. at 518–19. 
 58. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 37 (“The 
requirement that the testator must have substantially complied with the Wills 
Act . . . serves much the function of an afforced standard of proof. Complying 
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But the evidentiary problems arising under the will 
execution reform are potentially far more serious because, in 
theory, even documents that do not come close to following Wills 
Act requirements are still eligible to be probated.59 Langbein first 
confronted this problem in the context of his and Waggoner’s 
proposal to reform wills containing mistaken terms.60 In that 
analogous context,61 courts faced the same problem as arose with 
defectively executed wills: the evidence of mistake “must 
necessarily be presented when death has placed the testator 
beyond reply” and will involve statements “which he can now 
neither corroborate nor deny.”62 Just as the solution to the 
problem of faulty execution had traditionally been to invalidate 
the will, the solution to the problem of “inherently suspect”63 
extrinsic evidence in the reformation context had traditionally 
been to exclude it.64 But there was an alternative, which courts 
had already used when asked to reform non-testamentary 
documents executed inter vivos, even when reformation was 
                                                                                                     
substantially necessarily involves conduct that evinces unmistakable 
testamentary intent.”). 
 59. See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 569 
(“To the extent that a mistake case risks impairing any policy of the Wills Act, it 
is the evidentiary policy that is in question.”). 
 60. Id. Proposed in 1982, the reformation reform fell between the time of 
the substantial compliance and harmless error proposals. Although introduced 
after the reformation reform, the harmless error execution reform was adopted 
by the UPC first, in 1990. The reformation reform did not appear in the UPC 
until later, in 2008. See John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property 
Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and 
Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 8–9 (2012) [hereinafter Langbein, 
Major Reforms] (“In 2008, the Uniform Law Commission amended the Uniform 
Probate Code to incorporate the Restatement's reformation rule, giving the rule 
a statutory basis in enacting jurisdictions.”). 
 61. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 35–36 
(asserting a “cogent analogy” between problems of mistaken terms and mistakes 
in execution). 
 62. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 525; see 
also Gazur, supra note 8, at 406 (observing that a will is different from other 
instruments because it is the statement of the testator who “is always deceased 
and unable to testify when the instrument is interpreted, raising the possibility 
of fraud and unreliable, self-serving testimony by those hoping to change the 
outcome under the will”). 
 63. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 526. 
 64. See id. at 525 (identifying the testator’s primary protection against 
mistaken or fabricated evidence as the exclusion of all evidence). 
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sought after the death of the donor. That alternative was to 
require the evidence of mistake to be “clear and convincing.” This 
higher standard of proof was described as “the essential 
safeguard” in the reformation cases.65 “The safeguard that 
prevents reformation from being abused—for example, by being 
employed to interpolate a spurious term—is the ancient 
requirement of an exceptionally high standard of proof.”66 
The South Australian statute on which Langbein modeled 
the harmless error reform responded to the evidentiary danger 
inherent in mis-executed wills by requiring that there be “no 
reasonable doubt” that the decedent intended the document to 
serve as his will.67 This standard, so resembling the “beyond 
reasonable doubt” standard applicable in criminal, but not civil, 
cases in the United States, struck Langbein as too demanding.68 
While the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily 
applicable to civil litigation might be appropriate in substantial 
compliance cases because “complying substantially necessarily 
involves conduct that evinces unmistakable testamentary 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 526, 578; see also UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2010) (“Because reformation may involve the addition [or deletion] of 
language to the instrument . . . reliance on extrinsic evidence is essential. To 
guard against the possibility of unreliable or contrived evidence in such 
circumstance, the higher standard of clear and convincing proof is required.”). 
 66. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 568; see 
also id. (“It is the heavy burden of proof according to a clear-and-convincing-
evidence requirement that is the real safeguard against fraud and abuse, rather 
than the categorical denial of relief.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining that 
the new strategy to deal with “inherently suspect” extrinsic evidence is not to 
exclude it altogether, as had been the case in the past, but to “guard against 
giving effect to fraudulent or mistaken evidence by imposing an above-normal 
standard of proof”).  
 67. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 9 
(quoting Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1975 (S. Aust.) s 9 (Aust.) (amending 
the Wills Act of 1936, §§–1975 (S. Aust.) s 12(2), 8 S. Aust. Stat. 
665)) (instructing courts to deem a document a will if it is satisfied “that there 
can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to 
constitute his will”).    
 68. See id. at 34 (“[I]n some [of the cases under the South Australian 
dispensing power statute] adherence to the BRD standard would have required 
courts to frustrate well-proven testator’s intent under a remedial statute that 
was designed to achieve the opposite.”). 
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intent,”69 he argued that in harmless error cases the clear and 
convincing evidence standard struck “the appropriate balance.”70  
The official comments to both the UPC and Restatement 
reform provisions link the use of the clear and convincing 
evidence standard for the mistake correction reforms in wills law 
to the traditional justifications for the use of the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in other legal contexts. In 
Addington v. Texas,71 where the standard of proof for involuntary 
commitment was at issue, the United States Supreme Court 
described three functions served by elevated proof standards: 
1) instructing the fact finder about the degree of confidence in the 
correctness of factual conclusions, 2) allocating the risk of error 
between litigants, and 3) indicating the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision.72 The comment to UPC section 
2-503 invokes the risk allocation and importance-signifying 
functions directly: “By placing the burden of proof upon the 
proponent of a defective instrument, and by requiring the 
proponent to discharge that burden by clear and convincing 
evidence . . . Section 2-503 imposes procedural safeguards 
appropriate to the seriousness of the issue.”73 The comment to 
Restatement section 12.1 permitting reformation of mistaken 
terms refers to all three functions: “The higher standard of proof 
under this section imposes a heightened sense of responsibility on 
the trier of fact,” “imposes a greater risk of an erroneous factual 
determination on the party seeking reformation,” and, by inviting 
searching appellate court scrutiny, “pressures the trial judge to 
do an especially careful job.”74 Thus the clear and convincing 
evidence standard marks the execution and term correction 
reforms of the Wills Act as high-stakes decisions in which it is 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 37. 
 70. Id.  
 71. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 72. Id. at 423. The third factor is restated later in the opinion as 
“impress[ing] the factfinder with the importance of the decision.” Id. at 427. 
 73. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013). 
 74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2015). Comment e to Restatement section 12.1 cites 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), an authority the U.S. Supreme Court relied 
on in Addington. 441 U.S. at 423–28. 
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especially important for courts to pay close attention and worry 
about accurate fact-finding.75 This attention to accuracy is 
integral to the reform.  
The higher degree of certainty required under and provided 
by the clear and convincing evidence standard responds to 
another potential problem posed by the relaxation of the 
formalism of older wills law, the threat of an explosion of 
previously foreclosed litigation over the validity and meaning of 
wills.76 “Perhaps the most recurrent concern in discussions about 
the merits of a harmless error rule for Wills Act blunders,” 
Langbein wrote, “is the fear of a litigation imbroglio.”77 Relatedly, 
permitting reform of mistakes in will drafting or execution might 
invite a different slippery slope problem of carelessness in will 
preparation.78 
                                                                                                     
 75. There are many provisions of the UPC other than section 2-503 and 
section 2-805 providing that a certain fact will be deemed true or presumed 
under specified circumstances, but permitting the contrary to be shown if the 
facts offered to rebut the presumed state of affairs are established by clear and 
convincing evidence. See generally, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104, 2-210, 2-
702, 5-311 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). The mistake correction 
reforms can be seen to fit this pattern in that, as explained infra text 
accompanying notes 60–63, they state a presumption that faulty execution 
bespeaks lack of testamentary intent, but permit the contrary to be shown if 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. The other UPC provisions relying on 
clear and convincing evidence are akin to the mistake correction reforms in that 
they involve facts of unusual importance, such as death, survival or parentage. 
As is the case with will execution errors and mistake correction, in these cases 
much also turns on the outcome, and thus the factfinder must both understand 
the importance of the issue before him and have a high degree of confidence in 
the factual conclusions reached.  
 76. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 36 (“[T]he 
drafters of the South Australian statute sought a higher-than-ordinary standard 
of proof . . . [because] [t]hey were inviting litigation about an issue . . . that due 
compliance . . . forecloses, namely, whether to treat an imperfect instrument as 
a will.”). 
 77. Id. at 37.  
 78. For recent commentary echoing this concern, see, e.g., Mark Glover, 
The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 KAN. L. REV. 139, 173 
(2012) [hereinafter Glover, The Therapeutic Function] (“[A] rule of relaxed 
formalism could encourage testators to execute wills informally and without the 
assistance of a lawyer.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and 
Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 829 
(2014) (“The harmless error power might tend to encourage carelessness and 
breed litigation, or open up avenues for fraud.”); Kelly, Toward Economic 
Analysis, supra note 5, at 878 (“In theory, adopting harmless error or 
reformation could affect the incentives of a testator or the testator’s attorney” to 
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The response to the concern about a litigation explosion had 
two parts. The first focused on the kind of litigation that arises 
under the automatic-invalidity rule that the reforms set out to 
change. If a court’s only option with respect to an improperly 
executed will is to deny it probate, then in cases of technical 
noncompliance there is pressure to interpret the facts in a 
strained manner to reach the conclusion that despite what might 
look like evidence to the contrary the will was in fact properly 
executed.79 This pressure produces a case law that the reformers 
described as “awkward”80 and sometimes “dishonest.”81 The 
reformers claimed that the new, purposive, analysis required 
under the reforms’ approach would produce better litigation: “The 
choice is not between litigation and no litigation. In cases of 
defective compliance the important choice is between litigation 
resolved purposefully and honestly . . . or irrationally and 
sometimes dishonestly under the rule of literal compliance.”82 
Litigation that more honestly and directly addressed the real 
concerns would, in turn, render litigation more “predictable.”83 
But the reformers’ claim went further. Improving the quality 
of the litigation, they argued, would lead to a reduction in certain 
kinds of suits: “A harmless error rule actually decreases litigation 
about Wills Act formalities,” suppressing litigation about 
“technicalities of compliance.”84 But what would really reduce the 
                                                                                                     
take care in executing or reviewing the terms of a will). 
 79. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 525  
“The rule of literal compliance can produce results so harsh that 
sympathetic courts incline to squirm,” asking questions such as, “Is a 
wave of a testator’s hand a publication or an acknowledgement. Was 
the signature ‘at the end’? When the attesting witnesses were in the 
next room, were they in the testator’s presence?” (citations omitted).  
 80. Id. at 526. 
 81. Id. at 525. 
 82. Id. at 526; see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1016 (“[U]nder the 
dispensing power the issues litigated will change for the better. Litigation about 
formalities will lessen; litigation about testamentary intent will increase.”). 
 83. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 51. 
 84. Id.; see also Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 526 
(“[T]he standard would be more predictable, and contestants would lose their 
present incentive to prove up harmless defects.”). Indeed, Langbein speculated 
that it was the older rule that might foster needless litigation: “[A]t least for 
execution defects of the near-miss type, the rule of strict compliance may 
actually promote litigation, by inciting courts to bend the ostensible rules in 
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quantity of suits—the real preventative to the feared “litigation 
imbroglio”—was the heightened evidentiary standard built into 
the reforms. “The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard,” 
Langbein wrote, “would raise the threshold for directed verdict 
and summary judgment to a level that would 
deter . . . litigation.”85 This thought is echoed in the Comment to 
Restatement section 12.1: “The higher standard of 
proof . . . imposes a greater risk of an erroneous factual 
determination on the party opposing reformation . . . . This 
tilt . . . deters a potential plaintiff from bringing a reformation 
suit on the basis of insubstantial evidence.”86 Lest all this seem 
too hypothetical, the reformers had hard evidence to back it up. 
Litigation levels in Australia were “astonishingly low.”87 
Neither, it was argued, would the reforms truly risk the 
other potential slippery slope problem of inviting careless 
execution or drafting. The reformed provisions, with their direct 
mention of evidence, mark the new statutes as rules of litigation. 
The reformers argued that professional estate planners never 
rely on litigation;88 to the contrary, “they opt for maximum 
formality, in order to be in the best possible position to defend the 
will against any claim of imposition or want of finality.”89 Nor 
would the reforms “attract the reliance of amateurs, nor increase 
the number of homemade wills.”90 Those are the wills, of course, 
about which litigation is assumed to be most frequent,91 but the 
                                                                                                     
ways that make the outcomes hard to predict.” Langbein, Excusing Harmless 
Errors, supra note 10, at 28. 
 85. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 587. 
 86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2015).  
 87. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 51; see also 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) 
(“Experience in Israel and South Australia strongly supports the view that a 
dispensing power like Section 2-503 will not breed litigation.”). 
 88. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 524 
(“Precisely because the substantial compliance doctrine is a rule of litigation, it 
would have no place in professional estate planning.”); Langbein & Waggoner, 
Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 587 (“Precisely because the reformation 
doctrine is a rule of litigation, no draftsman would plan to rely on it when 
proper drafting can spare the expense and hazard of litigation.”). 
 89. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 524. 
 90. Id.  
 91. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 8 
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reformers asserted that the standard of proof would reduce 
lawsuits over them.92 If the proponent’s burden of proof of a 
defective will is “onerous,”93 as it would be under the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, then he will “forego the trouble 
and expense of hopeless litigation.”94 
C. Reform, Not Revolution 
In the end, the reformers conceptualized the harmless error 
rule as simply a variant on a presumption already implicitly 
present in the Wills Act.95 When a will is proper in form, it is 
presumed to reflect serious, genuine, authentic testamentary 
intent.96 But the presumption is rebuttable.97 Contestants may 
challenge the presumption raised by due execution by showing 
inter alia that the testator lacked capacity or did not in the 
circumstances truly intend the executed instrument to serve as 
                                                                                                     
(explaining that “Wills Act execution blunders arise mostly in home-executed 
wills”). But see infra notes 346–350 and accompanying text (challenging the 
assertion that mistakes are made only by those who lack means or access to 
legal advice). 
 92. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 566 (“By 
substituting a purposive analysis for a formal one, the substantial compliance 
doctrine would actually decrease litigation about the formalities. The standard 
would be more predictable, and contestants would lose their present incentive to 
prove up harmless defects.”). 
 93. Id. at 525. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 513 (“Proponents . . . are now entitled to presume from due 
execution . . . the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfillment of the 
Wills Act purposes.”). 
 96. See R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Weight and Effect of Presumption or 
Inference of Due Execution, 40 A.L.R.2d 1223, § 1 (originally published in 1955) 
(“It is a relatively well-established principle of the law of wills that when it is 
shown that a will has been attested . . . a presumption arises that the will was 
duly executed, that is, that it was executed with the formalities required by 
law.”); Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 513 (explaining that 
this presumption serves to “routinize probate” and “transform hard questions 
into easy ones”).  
 97. See Hursh, Weight and Effect of Presumption or Inference of Due 
Execution, supra note 96, § 7(a) (“Both the courts which regard the presumption 
arising from proof of attestation of a will as one ‘of fact’ and those which regard 
it as one ‘of law,’ are in agreement that the presumption is a rebuttable one, and 
may be overcome by evidence to the contrary.”). 
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his will.98 The “central insight” underlying the harmless error 
rule is just the mirror image: “[T]he law could avoid so much of 
the hardship associated with the rule of strict compliance if the 
presumption of invalidity now applied to defectively executed 
wills were reduced from a conclusive to a rebuttable one.”99 Thus, 
under the will execution reform, lack of due execution gives rise 
to the presumption that the document was not intended as the 
testator’s will, but proponents may challenge that presumption 
by showing that, despite the execution defect, the testator did 
seriously intend the document to serve as his will.100 Like other 
important factual presumptions created by the UPC, the rebuttal 
must be clear and convincing.101 The reforms were presented as a 
significant change in the law, but not a revolutionary one. 
Before moving on to the cases applying the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, it is worth noting three other 
important limits on the reforms’ ambitions. First, the will 
execution reform was not intended to displace the Wills Act 
formalities, which continued to be seen as creating a safe harbor 
for the testator, who, by complying with the formal execution 
rules, “assures his estate of routine probate in all but exceptional 
circumstances.”102 All the harmless error rule did was recognize 
that “when the testator has made a mistake in complying with 
the formalities, it does not follow that the purposes of the Wills 
Act have been disserved.”103 Those purposes—ritual, evidence, 
etc.—remained unquestioned; it was only the 
automatic-invalidity rule that was to be altered.104 
                                                                                                     
 98. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 500 (“Such 
fundamental requisites as the testator’s capacity and testamentary intent are 
presumed from due execution, subject of course to disproof.”). 
 99. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 3. 
 100. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 513 
(explaining the function and methods under which the presumption operates). 
 101. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing these 
presumptions). 
 102. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 4.  
 103. Id.  
 104. See id. at 6 (“[A] legal system should be able to preserve relatively high 
levels of formality, in order to enhance the safe harbor that is created for the 
careful testator who complies fully, without having to invalidate every will in 
which the testator does not reach the harbor.”). 
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Second, the reformers repeatedly described the mistakes 
subject to correction as “innocuous” or “accidental”;105 
paradigmatic examples included situations where one of two 
required witnesses left the room to use the lavatory before the 
other witness had completed his signature, where a typist 
dropped a paragraph, or where a husband and wife each 
inadvertently signed the will prepared for the other.106 Notice 
that in all of these situations, the testator has a fixed intent, but 
the actions of others, or improper supervision, have caused a 
problem. Indeed, the reforms explicitly bar relief for failure to 
execute a document or for post-execution changes of mind.107 The 
reforms do not address or remedy irresolution. 
Finally, the reforms focus on the interpretation of a 
document. The “right question,” under the harmless error reform, 
is “whether the document embodies the unequivocal 
testamentary intent of the decedent.”108 What must be 
established, “in a clear and convincing manner,” is that “the 
testator adopted the document as his or her will.”109 Uniform 
Probate Code section 2-805 only permits reformation of mistaken 
                                                                                                     
 105. John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in 
Wills, 18 PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 28, 29 [hereinafter Langbein, 
Curing Execution Errors]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b rptr’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2015) 
(referring to “innocent” defects). 
 106. See Langbein, Major Reforms, supra note 60, at 7–10 (listing examples 
of cases involving mistaken wills); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“A will that fails 
to comply with one or another of the statutory formalities, and hence would be 
invalid if held to a standard of strict compliance with the formalities, may 
constitute just as reliable an expression of the intention as a will executed in 
strict compliance.”); see also Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra 
note 38, at 581 (describing as the “prototypical case of clerical error where the 
case for a reformation is so compelling” as one in which “terms [were] deleted or 
garbled by a typist”). 
 107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining circumstances under 
which relief is barred). 
 108. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 34; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. 
b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“Only a harmless error in executing a document can be 
excused under this Restatement.”). 
 109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015).  
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terms contained in a “governing instrument.”110 The reforms do 
not contemplate new, improvisational methods for expressing 
testamentary wishes. Rather they adopt a traditional picture of 
the testator setting down his considered, final wishes in an 
authenticated writing.111 All that would change is that “harmless 
errors” in the execution of that writing, or in its terms, could be 
ignored, so long as the intent that the document serve as the 
testator’s will is proven by “clear and convincing evidence.” 
III. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Applied 
Fewer than a dozen states have adopted one or both of the 
mistake correction reforms either by statute or judicially.112 How 
many other states will follow is unclear. One factor that may bear 
on the choice is experience with the application of the new 
provisions in the states that have adopted them.113 That 
                                                                                                     
 110. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). 
 111. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 4 (“If legal 
policymakers were put to the choice between a regime of no Wills Act 
formalities, on the one hand, versus the Wills Act as traditionally applied on the 
other hand, there would be a large consensus in favor of the status quo.”). 
 112. Ten states have adopted UPC section 2-503 in whole or in part: 
California (CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West 2015)); Colorado (COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 15-11-503 (2014)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-503 
(LexisNexis 2015)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2014)); Montana 
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2014)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. 3B:3-3 (West 
2015)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (LexisNexis 2015)); South Dakota 
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2015)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-2-503) 
(LexisNexis 2015)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2015)). California 
and Ohio limit the harmless error rule to attestation errors, while Colorado and 
Virginia exclude almost all signature errors. Six states have adopted UPC 
section 2-805: Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-806 (2014)); Florida (FLA. 
STAT. § 732.615 (2014)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-805 (LexisNexis 
2014)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-05 (2015)); South Carolina 
(S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-601(B) (2015)); and Utah (UTAH. CODE ANN. § 75-2-805 
(LexisNexis 2015)). Courts in New York have adopted the principles of 
Restatement section 12.1. See In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (applying principles of Restatement section 12.1 to allow 
extrinsic evidence on the issue of intent). 
 113. I emphasize that this experience is but one factor. As with much of 
wills law, little empirical data exists explaining why the reforms have not been 
more widely adopted. The reasons might range from legislative inertia to 
disagreement about the likelihood that more wills would be contested to 
rejection of the concept of the reform. 
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experience is sobering. Some courts seem to apply the clear and 
convincing evidence standard as the drafters intended—to uphold 
wills afflicted with only trivial errors while weeding out 
challenges where the evidence is truly mixed and conclusions 
about the testator’s intent seem unreliable. Others, however, 
have struggled. In one category of cases, courts seem bewildered 
by what they need to find clear and convincing evidence of. 
Uniform Probate Code section 2-503, for example, requires a high 
degree of certainty that the document was intended as decedent’s 
will. Courts in these cases have inquired instead whether there is 
a high degree of certainty that a particular dispositional outcome 
was intended. A second problem involves confusion about what it 
means for evidence to be “clear and convincing.” Courts have not 
always been careful about the probative value of the evidence on 
which they rely. Finally, although the drafters urged appellate 
courts to police the clear and convincing evidence requirement 
“with rigor,” standards of review—especially review standards 
relating to trial courts’ factual findings—are very lenient.   
The universe of case law is not particularly large. There is no 
way to ascertain whether the cases are typical of disputes arising 
around wills generally or mistaken wills particularly.114 It is 
possible that the reforms are working as their proponents 
expected, deterring litigation in all but the most contested 
cases.115 
                                                                                                     
 114. Even those wills scholars who have relied on sets of reported cases as 
data have noted the many distortions in the sample. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, 
Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1430–32 (2013) [hereinafter Hirsch, 
Incomplete Wills] (noting that “skewing could result from the data set’s 
limitation to decedents whose estates are probated”). See also generally George 
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984) (explaining the general problem of selection effects in studies of 
cases). 
 115. But see Sherwin, supra note 8, at 471 (“Economic models of litigation 
and settlement behavior suggest that a high standard of proof will not have a 
substantial effect on the volume of disputes actually litigated.”). See also David 
Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, 
California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 629–30 (2015) (explaining that empirical studies 
of probated wills in one California county showed high rates of litigation, 
suggesting that “probate has become the domain of the messy estate”). 
The reformers’ claim that the clear and convincing evidence standard would 
deter trivial litigation assumes that potential contestants, familiar with the 
newly-reformed law, will decide whether or not to litigate based on a rational 
assessment of their chances of prevailing. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless 
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That said, if the reforms are meant to correct only 
well-evidenced technical defects, the cases are troubling. The 
problem derives from the fact that many of the cases depart from 
the paradigm the reforms contemplate—a testator with a clearly 
formed intent which he has tried to express in a single document, 
but who is tripped up by an errant detail of execution or 
expression. This testator’s technical mistakes might have an 
evidentiary solution. But the testators in the cases that seem 
most to trouble the courts have ambiguous, fluid intentions, often 
expressed in multiple documents, and their mistakes extend 
beyond the narrow bounds of the reforms. Courts are as 
concerned to effectuate the intentions of these more tentative 
testators as they are the more certain testators the reforms 
envision. To achieve this goal, they must push against, and 
sometimes overstep, the narrow boundaries of the reforms. 
A. Some Benchmark Cases 
The paradigm case for applying the will execution reform 
rule as the reform’s drafters seem to have envisioned it would 
involve a purely technical execution error coupled with virtually 
uncontradicted evidence that the noncompliant document was 
nonetheless intended as the decedent’s will. In this regard, 
consider Estate of Berg.116 Shirley Berg’s 2003 will was witnessed 
by two witnesses and contained an attestation clause creating a 
presumption of due execution.117 Nonetheless, it was undisputed 
                                                                                                     
Errors, supra note 10, at 39 (“[C]ases that arise in well-settled categories of 
section 12(2) doctrine would not be litigated under the American pro-waiver 
rule, for all the reasons that people do not in general bring hopeless lawsuits.”). 
There is little empirical evidence to support the claim that decisions whether or 
not to bring will contests are based on assessments of their chances of prevailing 
at trial, as opposed to intensity of feelings based on family circumstances. See 
generally Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical 
Study of How People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 
325 (2015) (reporting data from interviews that showed that there was more 
conflict in remarried and stepparent families than in other families). 
 116. No. 268584, 2006 WL 2482895 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006). 
 117. Id. at *1. On the function of attestation clauses, see DUKEMINIER & 
SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 154 (explaining that attestation clauses give rise to a 
rebuttable presumption of due execution and may allow a will to be admitted to 
probate even if the witnesses predecease the testator or cannot recall the events 
of execution). 
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that one of the witnesses did not actually see Berg sign the will or 
acknowledge her signature as required by the Michigan will 
execution statute.118 Thus, under traditional law, Berg’s will 
could not be admitted to probate.119 But Michigan has adopted 
UPC section 2-503, allowing the court to inquire whether the 
defect in execution truly raised doubts about Berg’s intent. 120 The 
evidence showed that Berg had called the scrivener and told him 
that she wanted to update her will, that the newly prepared will 
conformed to her instructions, that she told the scrivener that she 
no longer wanted the disposition in her prior will, and that she 
reviewed and approved the revised will just one or two days 
before its execution.121 
The execution defect in Berg is exactly the sort of error to 
which the execution reform statute is addressed. The case 
involves an attestation mistake, but attestation is, compared to 
writing and signature, the least essential formality.122 Failure to 
probate the will made in 2003 would have resulted in the probate 
of an earlier will that did not reflect Berg’s current intent.123 No 
                                                                                                     
 118. See Estate of Berg, 2006 WL 2482895, at *1 (detailing the 
circumstances surrounding the attestation of the decedent’s will); see also MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2502(1)(c) (West 2015) (describing the attestation 
requirements in Michigan). 
 119. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2502(1) (establishing that “a will is 
only valid” if all formalities are respected). 
 120. Id. § 700.2503.  
 121. Estate of Berg, 2006 WL 2482895, at *2–3. 
 122. With respect to the South African experience, Langbein observed that 
the case law had produced a “ranking of the Wills Act formalities.” Langbein, 
Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 52. “Writing turns out to be 
indispensable” because “failure to give permanence to the terms of your will is 
not harmless.” Id. “Signature ranks next in importance” because leaving a will 
unsigned raises “grievous doubt about the finality and genuineness of the 
instrument.” Id. In contrast, attestation makes only a “modest contribution, 
primarily of a protective character. But the truth is that most people do not need 
protecting, and there is usually strong evidence that want of attestation did not 
result in imposition.” Id. The comments to UPC section 2-503 and Restatement 
section 3.3 both emphasize and reinforce this de facto hierarchy. 
One scholar has argued that the objectives of the will execution reform 
would be more effectively achieved simply by abolishing the requirement of 
attestation. See James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for 
Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 541 (1990) (proposing “abolishing the attestation 
requirement altogether”); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1025 (arguing that 
remedying attestation mistakes is the chief goal of the will execution reform). 
 123. See In re Estate of Berg, No. 268584, 2006 WL 2482895, at *2–3 (Mich. 
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one disputed the evidence showing that the newer will exactly 
reflected Berg’s final testamentary wishes.124 Denying probate 
would have served no purpose. From a reliability standpoint, the 
error was truly innocuous. And that is what the court held.125 The 
case serves as a template, illustrating the paradigmatic 
application of Uniform Probate Code section 2-503 to save a will 
from needless invalidation on entirely technical grounds. 
What makes Berg so appealing in its application of Uniform 
Probate Code section 2-503 is clarity of the evidence of both the 
mistake and the testator’s intent. But often the evidence is far 
murkier. Estate of Windham126 dealt with a will that Esther Vera 
Windham had properly executed on January 17, 2003 devising 
her estate to her son.127 Sometime later, Windham had crossed 
out her son’s name on her copy of the will, and written in the 
name of her daughter.128 Surrounding this change, Windham had 
written in the will’s margin comments about her family and her 
reasoning for making the change.129 In the weeks prior to her 
death, after she altered her copy of the will, she contacted her 
attorney and expressed her intention to change the will to benefit 
her daughter.130 
Had Windham crossed out her son’s name on the January 17, 
2003 will itself, she might have revoked the will by physical 
act.131 But the markings were made on a copy, not on the original 
                                                                                                     
Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006) (detailing the Court’s findings with respect to the 
testator’s intent). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan, 26, 2010). 
 127. See id. at *1 (detailing the circumstances under which the will was 
created and its subsequent changes). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The trial court apparently considered this theory; the statute providing 
for revocation by physical act is cited in the appellate court’s opinion. Estate of 
Windham, 2010 WL 293064, at *1. Under this statute, a will may be revoked by 
“a revocatory act on the will,” if the testator “performed the [revocatory] act with 
the intent and for the purpose of revoking the will or a part of the will.” MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2507(1)(b) (West 2015). The appellate court’s opinion 
does not precisely describe the trial court’s reasoning, but there would be no 
reason even to consider applying UPC section 2-503 if the will had been revoked 
under the revocation statute. 
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will, so technically they could not physically revoke it.132 Again 
under traditional law, the inquiry would end there, but because 
Michigan had adopted Uniform Probate Code section 2-503(b)133 
the court could consider whether, notwithstanding the technical 
problem, Windham’s interlineations were intended as a 
revocation of her will.134 The answer is not entirely clear. Surely 
she would not have crossed out her son’s name from the will if 
she remained determined that he should receive her estate. On 
the other hand, the inclusion of explanatory comments raised the 
possibility that, in the court’s words, “she lacked testamentary 
intent when she marked up her copy of the original January 17, 
2003 will and was only thinking of this marked up copy as a 
draft.”135 Moreover, her conversations with her attorney 
subsequent to the alteration could be interpreted to show that she 
did not believe she had effectively revoked her will simply by 
marking it up, and that she knew she needed to execute a further 
document.136 
Windham, then, is quite unlike Berg because the technical 
error is not trivial but raises uncomfortable questions about 
whether the testator had reached a completely final decision 
about disinheriting her son in favor of her daughter. Again, 
unlike Berg, the evidence was conflicting and inconclusive. Under 
these circumstances, excusing the error and giving legal effect to 
her marks might not implement the testator’s wishes. This is 
exactly what the trial court found, and the appellate court agreed: 
“We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding 
that Carr did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
Windham intended for the marked-up copy of the January 17, 
2003, will to result in a revocation of her original January 17, 
2003, will.”137 This case serves as a template opposite to Berg, 
                                                                                                     
 132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“The revocatory act must be 
performed on the will.”). But see In re Estate of Stoker, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529 
(Cal. App. 2011) (presenting an unusual decision in which revocatory acts 
performed on a copy of a will were deemed an effective revocation). 
 133. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2503(b) (West 2015). 
 134. Estate of Windham, No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Jan. 26, 2010). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at *2. 
 137. Id.  
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declining to apply Uniform Probate Code section 2-503 where the 
error is not innocuous and the evidence is mixed. 
Berg and Windham might be seen as benchmark cases. The 
attestation error that gave rise to the litigation in Berg was 
precisely the sort of meaningless misstep that had in the past led 
to unnecessary invalidation of a will the court was confident the 
testator wanted. The will execution reform was written precisely 
to avoid such a result, and was applied exactly as the reformers 
contemplated to permit probate in Berg. But the statute was not 
intended to correct all errors. The revocation error that gave rise 
to the litigation in Windham was not meaningless, and the 
accompanying evidence could not clarify what the testator truly 
wanted. The will execution reform was not meant to permit 
probate where it is unclear that the testator has come to a settled 
conclusion as to her wishes, and thus the court appropriately 
declined to apply the statute in Windham. Notice also that the 
clear and convincing evidence standard does seem to be doing 
some important work in both cases. In Berg, the clarity of the 
evidence of both the execution mistake and the Berg’s ultimate 
dispositive intention makes it easy to excuse the error. By 
contrast, the lack of clarity in Windham is what makes it feel 
dangerous to excuse the error. Unfortunately, as we shall see, not 
all cases share the qualities of these benchmark decisions. 
B. Intending the Will, Intending the Outcome 
Charles Kuralt was an iconic TV personality, known for his 
“On the Road” stories, for which he traveled America’s back roads 
in a mobile home seeking off-beat people and places.138 He was 
also a fraud, carrying on, behind his wife’s back and without her 
knowledge, a nearly thirty year affair with a woman known as 
Shannon (or, sometimes, as Pat).139 He and Shannon traveled 
together and maintained regular contact; he provided support for 
                                                                                                     
 138. See Charles Kuralt, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANNICA, http://www.britannica. 
com/biography/Charles-Kuralt (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (offering a short 
biography of Charles Kuralt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 139. See In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 772 (Mont. 1999) (setting out 
the facts relevant to the case). 
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her and her children, with whom he was also close.140 In 1985, 
Kuralt purchased a twenty-acre parcel of property on the Big 
Hole River in Montana, where he and Shannon built a cabin.141 
Subsequently, he purchased the two parcels adjacent to this 
property on both the upstream and downstream sides—together 
the parcels totaled ninety acres.142 
It appears that Kuralt wanted Shannon to have title to the 
Montana property.143 In 1989, he executed a holographic will in 
which he devised Shannon “all my interest in land, buildings, 
furnishings and personal belongings on Burma Road, Twin 
Bridges, Montana.”144 The holograph was technically valid in all 
respects,145 but it was revoked by the express revocation clause of 
a formal will Kuralt made in 1994.146 That will devised all of 
Kuralt’s real property to his wife, Petie.147 But Kuralt apparently 
remained determined that Shannon receive the Montana 
property. In 1997, he deeded Shannon the original 20-acre parcel, 
but for secrecy purposes he disguised the gift as a sale; Kuralt 
had provided Shannon the funds.148 Kuralt and Shannon 
allegedly agreed on the same procedure for the remaining 
acreage,149 but before that plan could be carried out, Kuralt 
became ill and was hospitalized in New York.150 From there, he 
hand wrote a letter that was a gift to the trusts and estates 
professors of every American law school.  It stated: 
June 18, 1997 
Dear Pat— 
Something is terribly wrong with me and they can’t figure out 
what. After cat-scans and a variety of cardiograms, they agree 
                                                                                                     
 140. Id. at 772. 
 141. Id. at 772–73. 
 142. Id. at 773. 
 143. Id. at 772. 
 144. Id.  
 145. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-521, 72-2-522 (2015) (setting out the 
requirements for a valid holographic will).  
 146. In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 773 (Mont. 1999). 
 147. Id. at 774. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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it’s not lung cancer or heart trouble or blood clot. So they’re 
putting me in the hospital today to concentrate on infectious 
diseases. I am getting worse, barely able to get out of bed, but 
still have high hopes of recovery . . . if only I can get a 
diagnosis! Curiouser and curiouser! I’ll keep you informed. 
I’ll have the lawyer visit the hospital to be sure you inherit the 
rest of the place in MT, if it comes to that. 
I send love to you & [your youngest daughter,] Shannon. Hope 
things are better there! 
Love, 
C151 
Kuralt used only his initial, but the Montana Supreme Court 
without directly addressing the issue found the “signature” to be 
adequate, stating that “Mr. Kuralt’s letter of June 18, 1997 meets 
the threshold formal requirements for a valid holographic 
will; . . . the letter is entirely in Mr. Kuralt’s handwriting and was 
signed by him.”152 Thus the “only issue” was “whether Mr. Kuralt 
possessed the requisite testamentary intent in writing the 
letter.”153 Notice that, had the Court ruled otherwise on the 
                                                                                                     
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 772 n.1. There is ample precedent in disputed signature cases for 
holding an initial to be a valid signature. See generally, e.g., In re Young, 397 
N.E.2d 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); In re Morris’ Estate, 74 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1969); Trim v. Daniels, 862 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1992). 
 153. In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 772 n.1 (Mont. 1999). Several 
scholars have noted that UPC section 2-503’s displacement of the formalities of 
will execution will make the existence vel non of testamentary intent the central 
issue in many cases—a development troubling in light of the lack of any clear 
test for defining or determining testamentary intent. See Kathleen R. Guzman, 
Intents and Purposes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 305, 352 (2011)  
The need for attention to testamentary intent has become even more 
acute over the past two decades. . . . Nowhere is this need more vivid 
than in jurisdictions adopting or influenced by the Restatement 
(Third) of Property and the Uniform Probate Code, which come 
closest to raising intent to a document-determinative position.  
Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1018 (“Now that any formality can be dispensed if the 
document was intended to be a will, the real limitation will be testamentary 
intent.”); Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 39–40) [hereinafter Glover, A 
Taxonomy] (“[T]he harmless error rule and the reformation doctrine give courts 
significantly more discretion to decide issues of testamentary intent than under 
traditional law.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2590209.  
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signature question, it would have had to face virtually the 
identical issue under Montana’s version of Uniform Probate Code 
section 2-503. The question would be whether, despite technical 
non-compliance with the formal requirements, Kuralt intended 
the document to be his will.154 
The District Court granted summary judgment to the Estate, 
holding that the letter “clearly contemplates a separate 
testamentary instrument not yet in existence to accomplish the 
transfer of the Montana property,”155 but the Supreme Court 
reversed, finding, in light of the extrinsic evidence of Kuralt’s 
intent to make the transfer, that “there arises a question of 
material fact as to whether Mr. Kuralt intended, given his state 
of serious illness, that the very letter of June 18, 1997, effect a 
posthumous disposition of his 90 acres in Madison County.”156 
The District Court, “following an abbreviated evidentiary 
hearing” on remand, found that the letter was indeed a valid 
holographic codicil to Kuralt’s formal 1994 will.157 This time the 
Montana Supreme Court affirmed.158 It stated that “the record 
supports the District Court’s finding that the June 18, 1997 letter 
expressed Kuralt’s intent to effect a posthumous transfer of his 
Montana property to Shannon” and that “the June 18, 1997 letter 
expressed Kuralt’s desire that Shannon inherit the remainder of 
the Montana property.”159 The Court’s conclusion is plausible, 
but—and this was the Court’s gift to trusts and estates  
professors—the question of Kuralt’s intent to transfer the 
property was not the issue in the case. The issue was, as the 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 24 (distinguishing 
“donative” testamentary intent, the intent that the document make a gift 
effective at death, from “operative” testamentary intent, “concerned with 
whether decedent intended a document that expresses donative intent to be 
legally effective”). 
 155. In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 772 (Mont. 1999). 
 156. Id. at 776. 
 157. See In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931, 933 (Mont. 2000) (recounting 
the district court’s reevaluation of the evidence that found the letter to be a 
valid holographic will displaying testamentary intent). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 933–34. See Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 24 
(distinguishing “operative” testamentary intent, the intent that a document 
have legal effect at death, from “substantive” testamentary intent, “concerned 
with identifying the specific gifts that the decedent intended to make”). The 
court in Kuralt clearly was not drawing distinctions this fine.  
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Court had correctly stated in its first decision, whether the letter 
of June 18 was itself intended to transfer the property to 
Shannon or, stated otherwise, whether Kuralt intended the letter 
to serve as a codicil to his will. Recall that the will execution 
reform was not intended to displace the requirement that the 
decedent’s testamentary wishes be embodied in an authoritative 
document.160 The issue in Kuralt was whether the letter was that 
document. The Kuralt case is infamous for its demonstration of 
how easy it is to slide from one question—whether the decedent 
intended a document to be his will—to the very different question 
of whether the decedent intended a particular dispositive 
outcome.161  
Courts are clearly capable of differentiating these questions. 
In Estate of Smoke,162 Clark Smoke made a will in 1977 in which 
he left only $1,000 to his son, who was then a young child, with 
the remainder left to his siblings.163 Two different letters written 
much later, in 2001 and 2002, expressed Smoke’s view that his 
son should receive Smoke’s interest in acreage jointly owned with 
Smoke’s two surviving siblings. One, to the siblings, stated, “I feel 
that the property should be partitioned in 3 equal parcels . . . to 
resolve the issue of who owns what. I am getting older and I want 
to avoid any problems of being able to devise my share . . . to my 
son.”164 Neither letter was eligible for probate as a will because 
                                                                                                     
 160. Supra notes 98–114 and accompanying text.  
 161. Another illustration of this slide is In re Estate of Southworth, LC No. 
09-046567-DE, 2011 WL 2623381 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5, 2011), a case explicitly 
invoking Uniform Probate Code section 2-503. In Southworth, the decedent 
made, but did not deliver, a deed giving her farm to petitioner. Id. at *1. The 
court found that UPC section 2-503 applied to defects in deeds as well as wills, 
and based on the scrivener’s testimony that the decedent had told her she 
wanted the farm to go to the petitioner, held that petitioner should receive the 
farm property. Id. at *3. “Applying the undisputed factual evidence regarding 
decedent’s intent to the plain language of MCL 700.2503,” the Court of Appeals 
wrote, “the probate court did not err in concluding that clear and convincing 
evidence of decedent’s intent to pass her [farm] to petitioner was presented.” Id. 
That may be so, but of course the issue under Uniform Probate Code section 
2-503 is not whether the decedent wanted to pass property to the recipient, but 
whether she intended a particular document to be the means of passing the 
property. 
 162. No. 2004-675901-DE, 2007 WL 4415499 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2007). 
 163. See id. at *1 (describing the events and circumstances that led to 
litigation). 
 164. Id. 
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neither was properly signed or witnessed.165 Smoke’s son sought 
probate under Uniform Probate Code section 2-503, but the court 
held that probate was properly denied. The court noted that “the 
proponent of the document must demonstrate that the document 
itself represents a valid and more recent testamentary 
instrument” and that it is “not enough” that the document 
reflects an intent “to someday make changes to his will” or 
“abandoned the intent embodied and formalized in the will.”166 
Although the decedent spoke of wanting to be able to devise the 
land to his son, “the decedent does not actually purport to devise 
anything in the letter.”167 Under these circumstances, “the 
probate court correctly found that respondent had not presented 
clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the 
letters to replace, amend, or revoke his earlier will.”168 
It might seem overly technical to insist on proof that the 
document is intended as the testator’s will, as opposed to proof 
that the testator had a particular dispositive wish.169 But that is 
what the drafters of the will execution reform provided. They had 
a declared reason for doing as they did. As we have seen, the 
reform does not question—but indeed is premised on—the view 
that a will properly executed serves as a safe harbor for the 
careful testator, who then may cease to worry that the unreliable, 
self-serving testimony of others might disturb his formally stated 
plan.170 An unbounded inquiry into the testator’s over-arching 
desires could completely disrupt this function.  This might have 
been true even for Kuralt. Kuralt first devised the Montana 
property to Shannon in a holograph.171 He then made a formal 
                                                                                                     
 165. Id. at *2. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at *3. 
 168. Id.  
 169. But see Guzman, supra note 153, at 361 (arguing, with respect to 
testamentary intent, that wills law should “[eliminate] the requirement that the 
decedent have intended the precise document proffered to be ‘The Will’”). 
 170. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 6 (“[A] legal 
system should be able to preserve relatively high levels of formality, in order to 
enhance the safe harbor that is created for the careful testator . . . without 
having to invalidate every will in which the testator does not reach the 
harbor.”). 
 171. See In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 773 (Mont. 1999) (“In the 
event of my death, I bequeath to Patricia Elizabeth Shannon all my interest in 
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will that did not mention the Montana property specifically, but 
that did have a separate provision for real property—in favor of 
his wife.172 Why? Perhaps the provisions of the formal will were 
largely inserted by his lawyer in New York, and Kuralt didn’t feel 
able to say much about them lest he expose his long-term affair. 
Or perhaps he changed his mind. How can we know? Subsequent 
to executing the formal will, Kuralt deeded the original Montana 
acreage to Shannon, suggesting he did want her to have at least 
that.173 But the evidence that he was planning to make the same 
arrangement for the remaining 90 acres largely came from 
Shannon. Her interest is obvious. It is no answer to say that time 
simply cut his Kuralt’s gift plan short. Kuralt knew how to write 
a holograph clearly and straightforwardly devising property; he 
had done so once before.174 Yet instead he wrote his chatty letter. 
Free-form litigation into these questions of Kuralt’s “real” intent 
would be less a reform of the Wills Act than an abandonment of 
its aspiration that the decedent express his final testamentary 
wishes in an authenticated document. Presumably this is why the 
will execution reform permits investigation of a testator’s intent 
that a document serve as a will, not the testator’s dispositive 
intent. 
Ambiguity about whether the document was truly intended 
as the final will can capture ambiguity about the testator’s final 
dispositive intent. Again, Kuralt is illustrative. Kuralt’s final 
letter speaks of having his lawyer visit the hospital at an 
unspecified future point in time to be sure that Shannon 
inherits—presumably via some transaction that the lawyer will 
facilitate.175 Read literally, it does not presently give, devise, or 
                                                                                                     
land, buildings, furnishings and personal belongings on Burma Road, Twin 
Bridges, Montana.”). 
 172. See id. (“I devise all my real property (including any condominium) 
which is used by me as a residence or for vacation purposes, together with the 
buildings and improvements thereon, if any, to my wife, PETIE, if she shall 
survive me.”). 
 173. See id. at 774 (“On April 9, 1997, Mr. Kuralt deeded his interest in the 
original 20—acre parcel with the cabin along the Big Hole River to Shannon.”). 
 174. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (providing the text of the 
holographic will that clearly identifies the property in Montana as meant for 
Shannon). 
 175. See Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d at 774 (“I’ll have my lawyer visit the 
hospital to be sure you inherit the rest of the place in MT. if it comes to that.”). 
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otherwise transfer anything. Kuralt’s earlier holograph, in contrast, 
was explicit, stating, “In the event of my death, I bequeath to 
Patricia Elizabeth Shannon all my interest in [the Montana 
property].”176 Since Kuralt clearly knew how to draft a document 
using language expressing present testamentary intent, it is not 
fanciful to think he lacked such intent with respect to the June 18 
letter.177 Thus, a focus on his intent with respect to the documents 
alone reveals uncertainty, without resort to a free-form, unlimited 
inquiry into his overarching wishes. This, at any rate, seems to be 
the design of the statute, which expressly requires “clear and 
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or 
writing to constitute” his will.178 And this is why it is noteworthy 
when courts depart from that design, engaging in a very different 
inquiry than the statute authorizes. 
Another recent and controversial case, In re Estate of 
Ehrlich,179 illustrates the gap between the two approaches and the 
potential dangers of moving away from the narrow statutory 
question. Richard Ehrlich, who had for fifty years been a trusts and 
estates lawyer, died in 2009, survived by a niece and two 
nephews.180 He had had no contact with the niece and one of the 
nephews for over twenty years, but he had an on-going relationship 
with the second nephew, Jonathan, and had told his closest friends 
that Jonathan was the person to whom he meant to leave the bulk 
of his estate.181 The only testamentary document that could be 
located after Richard’s death was a fourteen-page instrument with 
Richard’s name and law firm address printed in the margin of each 
page.182 The document made specific cash bequests to the niece and 
                                                                                                     
 176. Id. at 773. 
 177. But see Estate of Harless, 310 P.3d 550, 554 (Mont. 2013) (declining to 
probate a letter under section 2-503 because the letter “was not intended to be a 
will, nor did it provide for distribution of [the testator’s] assets upon [her] 
death”). 
 178. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (requiring that the proponent of an improperly 
executed will establish “by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent 
adopted the document as his or her will”). 
 179. 47 A.3d 12 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 180. See id. at 13–14 (relating the facts at issue). 
 181. Id. at 14. 
 182. Id. 
IRRESOLUTE TESTATORS 41 
nephew with whom Richard had been out of contact.183 Twenty-five 
percent of the residue was to pass to a trust for the benefit of a 
friend, Kathryn Harris, and the remaining seventy-five percent of 
the residue was to pass to Jonathan.184 
Neither Richard nor any witness signed the document.185 On 
the top right-hand corner of the cover page, however, appeared a 
notation in Richard’s handwriting: “Original mailed to H.W. Van 
Sciver, 5/20/2000.”186 Harry Van Sciver was named as executor and 
trustee in provisions of Richard’s purported will, but he predeceased 
Richard “and the original of the document was never returned.”187 
The will could only be probated under UPC section 2-503.188 
Most of the opinion is devoted to the controversial question of 
whether the complete absence of a signature renders UPC 
section 2-503 inapplicable.189 A vigorous dissent argued that the 
reform statute “may be invoked only in a circumstance where the 
document ‘was not executed in compliance’ with [the Wills Act]; it 
does not apply if the document is not executed at all.”190 The 
majority disagreed, asserting that “the plain language of the 
provision . . . expressly contemplates an unexecuted Will within its 
scope. Otherwise what is the point of the exception?”191 
This part of the opinion is disputable enough192 and has 
received considerable attention.193 But in some ways it is the 
                                                                                                     
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2005) (codifying UPC section 2-503). 
 189. See In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 16–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2012) (providing the court’s analysis of this central issue). 
 190. Id. at 20. 
 191. Id. at 17. 
 192. Recall the hierarchy of formalities, with the writing and signature at 
the apex of importance. Supra note 122 and accompanying text. There is also a 
slippery slope issue. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 
23–24 (“[S]ignature is the formality that permits us to distinguish between 
drafts and wills. [If probate of an unsigned will is permitted,] the risk arises 
that any unsigned draft, any scrap of paper, can be argued to be an intended, 
but unexecuted will.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Anthony R. La Ratta & Melissa B. Osorio, What’s in a Name? 
Writings Intended as Wills, 28 PROB. & PROP. 47, 50–53 (2014) (describing 
Ehrlich as “perhaps the most liberal application of the harmless error doctrine 
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remainder of the opinion that is more remarkable. According to 
the court, Uniform Probate Code section 2-503 requires that the 
proponent of a defective instrument prove “by clear and 
convincing evidence that the document was in fact reviewed by 
the testator, expresses his or her testamentary intent, and was 
thereafter assented to by the testator.”194 However, Uniform 
Probate Code section 2-503 does not speak to whether a document 
expresses the decedent’s “testamentary intent”; it speaks to 
whether the decedent intended a particular document to serve as 
his or her will.195 
As in Kuralt, the difference is not simply technical. The court 
in Ehrlich noted that the will’s main beneficiary, Jonathan, “was 
the natural object of decedent’s bounty”196 and that “in the years 
following the drafting of [the defective document], and as late as 
2008, decedent repeatedly orally acknowledged and confirmed the 
dispositionary contents therein to those closest to him.”197 Thus, 
“the unrefuted proof is that the decedent intended Jonathan to be 
the primary, if not exclusive, beneficiary of his estate, an 
objective the purported will effectively accomplishes.”198 Even 
though there was unrefuted testimony that Richard wanted to 
eliminate the provision in favor of Kathryn, and even though the 
document “is only a copy of the original will sent to decedent’s 
executor,”199 the court held that it was properly admitted to 
probate because any other outcome would have been 
“intent-defeating.”200 
                                                                                                     
to date”). 
 194. Id. at 18. The requirement that the document have been reviewed by 
the testator derives from In re Macool, 3 A.3d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010). See infra notes 162–175 and accompanying text (discussing In re Macool). 
Both cases are criticized in Glover’s A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent. Glover, 
A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 41–48. 
 195. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013) (“[T]he document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in 
compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing 
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the 
document or writing to constitute: 1) the decedent’s will . . . .”). 
 196. In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, at 18. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2012). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 19. 
 200. Id.  
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If the document was only a copy—and that indeed is what it 
was—then Ehrlich could not have intended that document to be 
his will.201 Had there not been evidence of a change of heart about 
the gift to Kathryn, it would be tempting to ignore this 
problem.202 But because there was unrebutted evidence that 
Ehrlich had changed his mind about at least part of the will, it is 
difficult to agree that the evidence was clear and convincing that 
he wanted this exact document to be probated. What the court 
seems to be saying is that the disposition in the purported will 
comes closer to effectuating Ehrlich’s intent than would intestacy, 
under which Jonathan would take no more than the disfavored 
niece and nephew. 
The execution reform statute’s framing of the issue—whether 
the decedent intended the disputed writing to constitute his 
will—ties the court’s inquiry about intent to a particular 
instrument. Without that focus, the inquiry risks becoming 
almost completely detached from anything about the document 
before the court and, if Ehrlich is in any way typical, 
correspondingly unbounded in scope. Asking whether a given 
document was intended as a will is quite different from asking 
whether the decedent would probably prefer its disposition to 
intestacy. Under that test, any draft could be offered as a will, as 
could virtually any earlier revoked will, as these documents in 
most cases show a dispositive intent different from the outcome 
supplied by the intestacy statues. We could have wills law that 
asks directly about what outcome might best approximate the 
testator’s dispositive intent: probate of the will, intestacy, or 
reformation of terms. However, the history, language, and 
                                                                                                     
 201. Ironically, as noted by the dissent, there are rules under which copies of 
lost wills can be probated, and the facts might have supported probating the will 
under those rules here. Id. at 24 (Skillman, J., dissenting). As the dissenting 
judge explained, “Although N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3 does not authorize the admission to 
probate of the unexecuted copy . . . there is common law doctrine under which a 
copy of a lost will may be admitted to probate if the party seeking probate can 
present satisfactory evidence of the original will’s contents . . . .” Id. at 24. The 
dissent would have remanded for further findings on whether the common law 
requirements had been met. See id. (discussing what steps would have been 
taken going forward by the dissent). 
 202. To some extent the court did ignore it. Even after noting that Ehrlich 
“wished to delete the bequest to his former friend, Kathryn Harris,” id. at 14 
(majority opinion), the court asserted that the unexecuted document “accurately 
reflects his final testamentary wishes.” Id. at 19. 
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comments to the reform provisions all confirm that wholesale 
change of this sort was not what was intended.203 Again, the 
purpose of the reforms was to deal with minor, “harmless” errors 
in the expression of fixed and specific intentions, not to create a 
new law of wills that would permit wide-ranging inquiries about 
general donative intent.204 
Yet, as these cases show, the courts do inquire. In terms of 
the evidentiary considerations that animate the wills law 
reforms, Kuralt and Ehrlich alike are “mistakes” and go well 
beyond the reforms’ literal boundaries. Yet it is hard to fault the 
courts for trying to carry out the wishes of these testators. Their 
errors do not line up precisely with the terms of the reforms, but 
that is because they are not the sort of testators the reforms 
contemplate. They do not have one, fixed intent that their wills 
inadvertently fail to express. Rather, they are ambivalent and 
change their minds over time; they cannot quite get to closure. 
The reforms, applied literally, will not help them. But the courts 
do not seem to accept the reforms’ limits.  Instead, they push 
beyond those limits to respond to those testamentary intentions 
that can be discerned, even though they are not the intentions 
the reforms contemplate. 
C. Clear, but Convincing? 
There is no agreed upon formula encapsulating what is “clear 
and convincing evidence.” Here are some sample statements. The 
evidence must be “so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as 
to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without 
hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue.”205 “Clear and convincing 
evidence is more than a mere preponderance; it is highly probable 
evidence free from serious or substantial doubt.”206 “Clear and 
convincing evidence is that amount of evidence which produces in 
                                                                                                     
 203. See Part II.C supra (examining the development of the will execution 
and mistake correction reforms in wills law). 
 204. See supra Part II.C (explaining the limited scope of the reforms). 
 205. In re Estate of Hoch, No. 09-00532, 2012 WL 1379846, at *5 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2012) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 
(1993)). 
 206. In re Estate of Wilfong, 148 P.3d. 465, 468 (Colo. App. 2006). 
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the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a 
fact to be proved.” 207  
It is common, however, for courts to vary in their formulation 
and expression of a legal standard. No evidentiary standard can 
define itself; all are indeterminate to some degree. Still, the idea 
behind requiring clear and convincing evidence seems intuitive 
enough; the factfinder need not be absolutely certain, but highly 
confident, about the fact in issue.208 Unfortunately, courts often 
fail to explain fully why they are so confident about the evidence 
before them, and thus it is not clear how well the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is functioning as an evidentiary 
safeguard.  
In re Estate of Hall209 is a “textbook” case illustrating the 
power of UPC section 2-503 in the case of botched will 
executions.210 In June 1997, Jim Hall and his second wife, Betty 
Lou Hall, met with their lawyer, Ross Cannon, to discuss the 
terms of a joint will.211 The joint will, once executed, would 
supersede an earlier will that Jim executed in 1984 in favor of his 
                                                                                                     
 207. In re Isvik, 741 N.W.2d 638, 648 (Neb. 2007); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e, rptr’s n.6 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2015) (listing additional interpretations of the “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard in various jurisdictions). 
 208.  “Absolute certainty about the truth of assertions can seldom be 
established,” and thus we can only be more or less confident or seek “a higher 
degree of probability” than would be attained under the conventional 
preponderance standard. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The literature on 
burdens of proof has variously described the functions of proof burdens in terms 
of confidence, probability, and the allocation of error and risk. See, e.g., Ronald 
J. Allen, How Presumptions Should Be Allocated—Burdens of Proof, 
Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 627, 641 (1994) (discussing allocation of the risk of error between 
litigants); Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a 
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 389–94 (1985) (discussing 
the current body of literature concerning the application of probability theory to 
the proof process); J. P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. 
REV. 242, 251–54 (1944) (discussing confidence levels).  
 209.  51 P.3d 1134 (Mont. 2002). 
 210.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 185 (utilizing Hall to 
illustrate the operation of UPC section 2-503); STEWART E. STERK ET AL., ESTATES 
AND TRUSTS 243 (4th ed. 2011) (utilizing Hall to illustrate the practical effects of 
UPC section 2-503). 
 211. See Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d at 1135 (reciting the factual scenario 
considered by the court). 
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daughters from a previous marriage.212 “After making several 
changes” to a draft the lawyer had sent them, “Jim and Betty 
apparently agreed on the terms of the Joint Will” and were 
prepared to execute it “once Cannon sent them a final draft.”213 
Before the changes were finalized, the meeting ended, at which 
time “Jim asked Cannon if the draft could stand as a will until 
Cannon sent them a final version.”214 Cannon replied that the 
will “would be valid if Jim and Betty executed the draft and he 
notarized it.”215 No one else was in the office at the time to serve 
as an attesting witness.216 Thus, Jim and Betty signed the will 
and Cannon notarized it.217 Jim died in October 1998 without 
executing any further testamentary documents.218 
In the absence of the witnesses required under the applicable 
Montana wills act,219 the will could be probated only under UPC 
section 2-503.220 The court found the evidence that Jim intended 
the marked up document to be his final will to be clear and 
convincing.221 It relied on the Joint Will’s specific revocation of all 
earlier wills and on Jim’s instruction, when Jim and Betty 
returned from Cannon’s office, that Betty should physically 
destroy the earlier, 1984, will.222 It also relied on the following 
colloquy, in which Betty testified: 
Question: Do you know if [Jim] gave [Sandra and Charlotte, 
Jim’s daughters] a copy of the new will? 
                                                                                                     
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. Under UPC section 2-502(a)(3), notarized wills are valid without 
witnesses. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3) (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2013). However, this provision has not been added to Montana’s will 
execution statute; it certainly was not in effect in Montana when Hall was 
decided. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522(c) (West 2015) (requiring the 
signatures of two individuals who witnessed the testator’s signing of the same 
document). 
 220. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523. 
 221. In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1136 (Mont. 2002). 
 222. Id. 
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Answer: I don't believe he did, no. 
Question: Do you know why? 
Answer: Well, I guess because we didn't have the completed 
draft without all the scribbles on it. 
Question: So he thought that will was not good yet? 
Answer: No, he was sure it was good, but he didn't give it to 
the girls. And we didn't give it to my son. We didn't give it to 
anybody. 
Question: Why? 
Answer: Because it wasn't completely finished the way Ross 
was going to finish it.223 
The court acknowledged that “all the scribbles” left Betty in 
doubt that the will was yet in final form, but dismissed this doubt 
in light of her later statement that “[Jim] was sure it was 
good.”224 The court added that “[w]hen asked if it were Jim’s and 
her intent for the Joint Will to stand as a will until they executed 
another one, she responded, ‘Yes, it was.’”225 Moreover, “Sandra 
points to no other evidence that suggests that Jim did not intend 
for the Joint Will to be his will.”226 Based on this evidence, the 
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision to 
admit the document to probate.227 
The evidence is more mixed than the court acknowledged. On 
one side, the lawyer told Jim and Betty that the marked up 
document would be valid if signed and notarized.228 On that 
basis, apparently, Jim had Betty destroy the earlier will, which 
was also expressly revoked in the later document.229 Betty 
testified that Jim intended the will to stand until they executed 
another one.230 But on the other side, Betty also testified, in a 
part of the colloquy the court ignored, that Jim and Betty did not 
give the document to their children because “we didn’t have the 
                                                                                                     
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1135. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1136. 
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completed draft” and “it wasn’t completely finished the way Ross 
was going to finish it.”231 This testimony is consistent with the 
fact that Jim referred to the document as “a draft” that was not 
the “final version.”232 And while Betty testified that it was Jim’s 
intent as well as her own that the Joint Will should stand, her 
interest makes her a somewhat unreliable narrator on that point. 
Only Jim could testify altogether reliably about his intent, and of 
course—and this is what makes these cases so hard—he was not 
available at the trial to clarify his intentions.  
If the question at hand were “could a court credibly decide 
that Jim intended the mark up as his will?,” the answer almost 
certainly would be “yes.” But the question at hand is whether (to 
recur to the formulations with which this section began) the 
evidence is clear enough to enable a court “to come to a clear 
conviction, without hesitancy,”233 of Jim’s intent or whether the 
evidence is “free from serious or substantial doubt”234 or produces 
“in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence 
of a fact to be proved.”235 The court simply did not address some 
of the more discomforting possibilities raised by the evidence. 
Perhaps Jim left the marked-up will alone because of his 
attorney’s assurances. However, thinking in a slightly different 
way, can we be confident that Jim did not have second thoughts 
about benefitting his daughters? Quite a while passed between 
the execution of the mark up, in June, and Jim’s death, in 
October, but this cuts two ways. Perhaps he never formally 
executed the will because he thought it unnecessary in light of 
what had been done in June. But perhaps he never formally 
executed the will because he did not want to finalize it. Neither 
the trial nor the appellate court seems to have considered these 
possibilities; certainly they do not appear in the opinion. 
The same lack of explicit attention to potentially 
countervailing evidence can be seen in In re Estate of Herceg,236 
                                                                                                     
 231. Id. (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. 
 233. In re Estate of Hoch, No. 09-00532, 2012 WL 1379846, at *5 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2012) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 
(1993)). 
 234. In re Estate of Wilfong, 148 P.3d 465, 468 (Colo. App. 2006). 
 235. In re Isvik, 741 N.W.2d 638, 648 (Neb. 2007). 
 236. 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2002). 
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which involves the reformation of a will for mistake. Eugenia 
Herceg’s 1999 will contained a residuary clause, but the clause 
named no beneficiary.237 Her prior will’s residuary clause devised 
the residue to her nephew Sergio or, if he failed to survive her, to 
Sergio’s wife Columba.238 Sergio predeceased the testator, and 
Columba petitioned “for construction of the will by reading the 
residuary clause to be the same as decedent’s prior will.”239 The 
attorney who drafted the 1999 will offered evidence that when 
the earlier will was redrafted in 1999 a computer glitch caused 
“some lines from the residuary clause” to be “accidentally 
deleted.”240 
“Obviously a mistake has been made,” the court noted.241 The 
question was whether the mistake could be corrected given the 
traditional law barring unattested extrinsic evidence.242 The 
court found itself facing a conflict between “two long-standing 
policies of the Law of Wills” one of which would prevent it from 
supplying via extrinsic evidence “what the testator has not,” and 
the other of which required it “to ascertain the intention of the 
testator to avoid intestacy.”243 Relying primarily on the 
Restatement reform—then in draft244—that permits 
consideration of “any evidence of testator’s intent, but raising the 
standard of proof from a preponderance of the evidence to clear 
and convincing evidence,”245 the court decided that it could indeed 
consider extrinsic evidence.246 
                                                                                                     
 237. See id. at 902 (examining the conflicting clauses in Herceg’s wills). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. at 903. 
 242. See id. (“The difficulty in this case is that there is a line of cases holding 
that where the name of the beneficiary is missing it cannot be supplied by 
construction or reformation of the will. . . . [E]xtrinsic evidence cannot be 
admitted unless there is an ambiguity in the will.”). 
 243. Id.  
 244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2003). 
 245. In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2002). 
 246. The court also considered some New York case law, but admitted that 
its holding was “a significant step beyond” the cited cases. Id at 904–05. 
“Nevertheless,” wrote the court, “it seems logical . . . to choose the 
path . . . recommended by the Restatement in order to achieve the dominant 
purpose of carrying out the intent of the testator.” Id. at 905. 
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Five facts were adduced in support of the court’s conclusion 
that “the evidence is clear and convincing that Columba 
Pastorino is the intended beneficiary of the residuary” of Herceg’s 
estate.247 First, not only did the residuary clause of Herceg’s prior 
will give the residue to Colomba if Sergio failed to survive, but 
the residuary clauses of two earlier wills contained an identical 
residuary disposition.248 Second, Herceg had named Columba as 
alternative executrix in her will, demonstrating that “Columba 
had not fallen out of favor with the testatrix and been 
deliberately removed from the residue.”249 Third, one of Herceg’s 
intestate heirs, a niece, who would take if the residuary clause 
failed, consented to the requested reformation, and was willing to 
acknowledge that the omission of a name in the residuary clause 
was a typographical error.250 Fourth, the attorney-scrivener’s 
affidavit stated that “Mrs. Herceg’s express intent was to 
continue the remainder of her property distribution as it was in 
the previous will.”251 Finally, there is a legal presumption against 
intestacy, especially with respect to residuary clauses.252 
This evidence could have been examined more critically than 
the case reflects. The residuary clauses of Herceg’s prior wills 
reflect the intent she had when she wrote those wills. But she 
wrote a new will in 1999,253 presumably because she had changed 
her mind with respect to some devises in her earlier wills. We 
cannot be sure whether her intent with respect to the residue 
remained constant. The fact that Columba was retained as 
alternative executrix shows only that Herceg had not changed her 
mind about Columba in that role. We still cannot be certain 
whether Herceg changed her mind with respect to the residue. 
The niece’s testimony, self-sacrificing as it may be, is irrelevant to 
the question at hand; without more information about her 
relationship to Herceg, it is impossible to determine what she can 
reliably tell us about Herceg’s wishes. Nor is the attorney entirely 
                                                                                                     
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 905. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 903. 
 253. Id. at 902. 
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reliable, as he might support Columba’s interpretation in order to 
avert a lawsuit that could otherwise arise out of his negligence in 
failing to complete the residuary clause. The presumption against 
intestacy is not a fact at all, and even if Herceg did intend to die 
testate, the presumption tells us nothing about whom she might 
have wanted to take her residuary estate.  
If the purpose of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
is to produce an especially careful, searching inquiry about 
will-making errors, the Hall and Herceg courts’ reluctance to 
consider or discuss alternative interpretations of the evidence is 
disquieting. Recall that one function of the clear and convincing 
evidence standard is to impose a higher sense of responsibility on 
the judge.254 The reforms contemplate that the judge will respond 
“by rendering a thorough, reasoned set of findings that deal with 
the relevant contested facts.”255 But in neither Hall nor Herceg 
does the court actually discuss the full range of possibilities 
presented by the evidence, raising questions whether the 
standard is functioning as intended to force the trial judge “to do 
an especially careful job.”256 
Some courts appear to take more care. Consider In re 
Macool,257 a case with some similarities to Hall and Herceg.258 
Louise Macool executed a will in 1995 in which she named her 
husband as the sole beneficiary and her step-children and 
step-grandchildren as contingent beneficiaries.259 In 2007 she 
executed a codicil in which she named as contingent co-executors 
different step-children than had been named in the 1995 will.260 
                                                                                                     
 254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (positing that the clear and 
convincing standard “imposes a heightened sense of responsibility on the trier of 
fact”). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. 3 A.3d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 258. There are, as we will see, also differences. It is unclear whether Macool 
is exactly parallel to any other decision given the court’s statement that “the 
facts underlying this case are so uniquely challenging that they have the feel of 
an academic exercise, designed by a law professor to test the limits of a 
student’s understanding of probate law.” Id. at 1261. 
 259. See id. (recounting the various steps taken by Macool in her attempts to 
plan the division of her estate). 
 260. Id. at 1262. 
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Less than a month after her husband’s death in 2008, she went to 
her lawyer’s office “with the intent of changing her will.”261 She 
provided the lawyer a handwritten note covering many specific 
wishes, almost none of which were described in terms 
immediately comprehensible to anyone other than Louise.262 But 
her lawyer discussed the issues with Louise, “using her 
handwritten notes as a guide,”263 and in her presence dictated a 
new will.264 The lawyer’s secretary then typed a draft of the 
will.265 Louise left the lawyer’s office to have lunch, and the 
lawyer expected her to make an appointment to review the draft, 
but—another fact delighting trusts and estates professors 
everywhere—she died an hour later without ever seeing the draft 
will.266 
Even had its instructions been entirely clear, the 
handwritten note could not be probated as a holographic will 
because it lacked a signature.267 The typed will also lacked both 
signature and witnesses, and thus it, too, could not be probated 
as a formal will.268 It was argued that the draft should 
                                                                                                     
 261. Id. at 1261–62. 
 262. The note read: 
get the same as the family Macool gets 
Niece 
Mary Rescigno [indicating address] If any thing happen[s] to Mary 
Rescigno[,] her share goes to he[r] daughter Angela Rescigno. If 
anything happen[s] to her it goes to her 2 children. 1. Nikos Stylon 2. 
Jade Stylon 
Niece + Godchild LeNora Distasio [indicating address] if anything 
happe[ns] to [her] it goes back in the pot 
I [would] like to have the house to be left in the family Macool. 
I [would] like to have. 
1. Mike Macool [indicating address] 
2. Merle Caroffi [indicating address] 
3. Bill Macool [indicating address] 
Take 
Id. at 1262. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 1264. 
 268. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2(a)(3) (West 2005) (requiring two witnesses 
to sign the document). 
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nonetheless be admitted to probate under UPC § 2-503.269 In 
addressing this claim, the court conceded that “the record clearly 
and convincingly shows that decedent intended to alter her 
testamentary plan.”270 But that did not conclude the analysis 
whether there was “evidence establishing, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that decedent intended the draft will 
prepared by [the attorney] to constitute her binding and final 
will.”271 Although the draft “substantially reflect[ed]” Louise’s 
handwritten notes,272 the attorney had included some of the 
designated contingent beneficiaries, but had omitted others.273 In 
addition, he had sought to implement the note’s instruction to 
“have the house to be left in the family Macool,” but he testified 
that he was unsure whether he had accurately captured her 
wishes.274 Louise had not specifically accepted any of these 
provisions.275 Under the circumstances, the court could not 
“conclude, with any degree of reasonable certainty, that [the 
attorney’s] approach would have met with decedent’s 
approval.”276 Thus, the trial court had been correct in 
determining that there was “insufficient evidence from which to 
conclude that decedent intended the particular draft document 
that [her attorney] prepared to be her will.”277 
Macool is not a total match with either Hall or Herceg. The 
testators in Hall did review the changes the lawyer made to their 
                                                                                                     
 269. See In re Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(“We next address plaintiff's argument that under N.J.S.A. 3B:3–3, the draft 
will should be admitted because there is clear and convincing evidence that 
decedent intended this document to constitute her will, or alternatively, a 
partial revocation of her prior will.”) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (codifying 
Unif. Probate Code section 2-503)). 
 270. Id. at 1264.  
 271. Id. In this part of the opinion, the court drew exactly the distinction 
that the courts in Kuralt and similar cases failed to make between “evidence 
showing decedent’s general disposition to alter her testamentary plans” and 
evidence establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that decedent intended 
an identified document, in this case the draft will “to constitute her binding and 
final will.” Id. 
 272. Id. at 1262. 
 273. Id. at 1264. 
 274. Id. at 1265. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id.  
 277. Id. at 1263. 
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will, whereas Louise Macool did not.278 The problem in Herceg 
was a simple omission, whereas the draft in Macool may have 
included terms of which Louise might have disapproved. The 
lawyer in Macool conceded uncertainty about whether he had 
accurately implemented Louise’s instructions, whereas the 
lawyers in the other cases seemed confident that they had (in 
Hall) or that they knew how they had failed (in Herceg).279  
But all three cases ultimately turn on whether the evidence 
of the decedent’s intent with respect to the document in question 
is clear and convincing. This analysis requires not just an 
enumeration of facts, but a consideration of what they do—and do 
not—tell us about the testator’s perception of the document. The 
court in Macool could have chosen to discuss or emphasize only 
those facts showing how the dictated will would have carried out 
the main points in Louise’s notes or, in the alternative, those 
showing how the overall design of the will would have 
implemented those of her wishes that could actually be discerned. 
But the court was careful not to do so, and equally careful in 
evaluating the gaps in what the evidence showed. If the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is to act as a real safeguard in the 
implementation of UPC section 2-503 and UPC section 2-805, we 
should expect courts to confront as honestly as in Macool the 
weaknesses of the evidence offered. 
And yet the outcomes of Hall and Herceg are by no means 
absurd and, even if their reasoning is on the thin side, it is hard 
to argue that the cases are wrongly decided. Why do they not feel 
more controversial? One reason is that the level of formality in 
both cases was quite high. The will in Hall was notarized, which 
                                                                                                     
 278. The court in Macool concluded that a writing can be admitted to 
probate as a will under New Jersey’s codification of UPC section 2-503 only if 
“(1) the decedent actually reviewed the document in question; and (2) thereafter 
gave his or her final asset to it.” Id. at 1265. For a critique of this holding, see 
Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 42. 
 279. See In re Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(mentioning that the lawyer who drafted the codicil in question indicated that 
the document was a rough draft, subject to review); In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 
1134, 1135 (Mont. 2002) (noting that the lawyer who drafted Mr. Hall’s will 
believed that the draft would be valid if it was signed and notarized, even in the 
absence of attesting witnesses); In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 
(N.Y. Super. Ct. 2002) (describing an affidavit from Ms. Herceg’s lawyer, who 
drafted the will in question, which acknowledges a computer “glitch” that 
caused the deletion of lines from the residuary clause). 
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under today’s UPC would have validated the will even in the 
absence of witnesses.280 Herceg’s will was properly executed. A 
second reason is that both cases involve scrivener errors, not 
mistakes by hapless testators who were indifferent or oblivious to 
the requirements for valid wills. Third, the testators in Hall and 
Herceg both come closer than Louise Macool to the paradigm 
contemplated by both the will execution and the mistake 
correction reforms. The testators seem to have reached final 
conclusions about the disposition of their property, endeavored to 
have embodied those decisions in an authoritative document, and 
were frustrated in achieving their ends only by circumstances out 
of their control. Paradoxically, the closer the testator conforms to 
the paradigm, the less careful the courts seem to be about openly 
confronting evidentiary weaknesses. Yet, if these three facts are 
determinative, it’s hard to see what work the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is doing. It seems possible that the 
testators’ conformity to the will-making paradigm is more 
important to the outcome of these cases than the evidentiary 
standard. 
D. Policing the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard 
Over time, courts might more honestly confront the quality of 
the evidence before them if appellate courts scrutinized their 
factual findings and reversed those that were under-analyzed. 
The Comment to UPC section 2-503 explicitly encourages 
appellate courts to police the clear and convincing evidence 
standard “with rigor.”281 However, appellate review is unlikely to 
have much effect on lower court fact-finding because of the 
                                                                                                     
 280. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting that the absence of a 
witness does not invalidate a notarized will under UPC section 2-502(a)(3)). 
 281. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2013) 
By placing the burden of proof upon the proponent of a defective 
instrument, and by requiring the proponent to discharge that burden 
by clear and convincing evidence (which courts at the trials and 
appellate levels are urged to police with rigor), Section 2-503 imposes 
procedural standards appropriate to the seriousness of the issue. 
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relatively low standard of review applicable in many of the 
decisions.282 
As with the definition of “clear and convincing evidence,” 
courts differ in their formulations of the appropriate standard of 
review on appeal, some requiring that the trial court’s conclusion 
be “not clearly erroneous,”283 and others requiring that it be 
supported by “competent substantial evidence.”284 The procedural 
posture may matter, especially where a case has been decided by 
summary judgment in the court below.285 And courts may 
distinguish between matters of law or of equity, both reviewable 
“de novo,”286 and issues of fact, reviewable on a more deferential 
                                                                                                     
 282. On the general problem of appellate review of probate litigation, see 
John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994) (reviewing 
DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON AND 
JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)) 
The risk of error or worse in American probate adjudication is not 
adequately offset by the prospect of appellate review. Because the 
presumption of correctness that attaches to the trial court’s findings 
of fact is so difficult to overcome on appeal, [surrogate court judges 
have] little to fear. . . . On the Continent, by contrast, the 
disappointed civil litigant is entitled to review de novo, with no 
presumption of correctness below. Because review in these systems is 
retrial, the damage that an arbitrary, ignorant, or corrupt trial judge 
can cause is significantly reduced. 
 283. See In re Estate of Windham, No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1 
(Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (“The standard of review of findings of fact made 
by a probate court sitting without a jury is whether those findings are clearly 
erroneous.”); see also In re Gentile Trust, No. 289809, 2010 WL 4137450, at *6 
(Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2010) (reviewing the probate court’s factual findings for 
“clear error”). 
 284. See Morey v. Everbank, 93 So. 3d 482, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(explaining that it is not the appellate court’s function to conduct a de novo 
review of the evidence, but simply to “determine whether there exists in the 
record competent substantial evidence to support the judgment of the trial 
court”); Reid v. Sonder, 63 So. 3d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[I]n this case, 
it is not our function to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, but simply to 
determine whether there exists in the record competent substantial evidence to 
support the judgment of the trial court.”). 
 285. See, e.g., In re Leach, No. 304688, 2012 WL 4900516, at *1 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Oct. 16, 2012) (“We review de novo a probate court’s ruling on a motion for 
summary disposition.”). 
 286. See Purcella v. Olive Kathyrn Purcella Trust, 325 P.3d 987, 991 (Alaska 
2014) (“[T]he superior court’s application of law to fact is reviewed de novo”); In 
re O’Donnell, 815 N.W.2d 640, 644 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012) (“Where an equity 
question is presented, appellate review of that issue is de novo.”). 
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standard such as “clear error.”287 Sometimes courts find an issue 
such as the appropriateness of trust reformation to involve mixed 
questions of law and fact and purport to apply one standard (de 
novo) to the lower court’s legal conclusions and a separate 
standard (clear error) to its findings of fact.288 
Courts in some cases have been quite clear that the 
requirement of clear and convincing evidence does not affect the 
standard of review: “even where proof of a fact in the trial court is 
required by clear and convincing evidence, the standard for 
appellate review is substantial evidence.”289 This requires 
deference to the trial court, so “if there is a conflict in the 
evidence bearing on the question of decedent’s intent, or in the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, we are bound by 
the trial court’s determination of that conflict.”290 This deference 
is all the stronger where the issue involves the credibility of 
witnesses: “We ‘grant particular deference to the trial court’s 
factual findings when they are based primarily on oral testimony, 
because the trial court, not this court, performs the function of 
judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing conflicting 
evidence.’”291 This strong deference could affect the operation of 
                                                                                                     
 287. See Purcella, 325 P.3d at 991 (“We review the superior court’s findings 
of fact for clear error.”). On the history of the separate standards of review in 
law and in equity, see generally Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. Stone, Review 
of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190–217 (1937). 
 288. Purcella, 325 P.3d at 991; see also In re Estate of Southworth, No. 
297460, 2011 WL 2623381, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5, 2011) (reviewing the 
probate court’s analysis of a will’s language “de novo as a question of law,” but 
also noting that when the probate court engages in factfinding, a clear error 
standard of review is applied). 
 289. In re Estate of Lara, No. H039060, 2014 WL 2108962, at *6 (Cal. Ct. 
App. May 20, 2014); see also KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 340 (7th ed. 2013) (anticipating the problem of substantial error 
review in cases where the standard of proof is clear and convincing error). 
 290. Lara, 2014 WL 2108962, at *6 (quoting In re Estate of Beebee, 258 P.2d 
1101, 1105 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953)); see also Gassmann Revocable Living Tr. 
v. Reichert, 802 N.W.2d 889, 892 (N.D. 2011) (“[E]ven when reviewing findings 
made under a clear and convincing evidence standard, determination of the 
credibility of witnesses is a function of the trial court.”). 
 291. Purcella v. Purcella Tr., 325 P.3d 987, 991 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Day 
v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256, 260 (Alaska 2012)); see also In re Estate of Windham, 
No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (“[T]he 
reviewing court will defer to the probate court on matters of credibility, and will 
give broad deference to findings of fact . . . because of the probate court’s unique 
vantage point regarding witnesses [and] their testimony.”). 
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the UPC and Restatement reforms because, as is evident from the 
case descriptions in this Article, decisions involving the reforms 
often turn on the testimony of witnesses who (allegedly) heard 
the decedent talk about his estate plan, were present when the 
will was executed, received letters from the decedent, or 
otherwise have become privy to information possibly relating 
either to the decedent’s circumstances or wishes. In theory, 
appellate courts could ensure that lower courts applied the clear 
and convincing standard, while still deferring to lower court 
credibility determinations. In practice, this may be a tricky line to 
draw. 
It is difficult to tell from the small number of cases explicitly 
considering the standard of appellate review how great a role 
deference will play. In one case raising the issue of whether the 
creator of a trust revoked it by mistake, meaning only to change 
the trustee, the appellate court, employing a “de novo” review 
standard, reached an “independent conclusion as to whether 
there was clear and convincing evidence” about whether the 
settlor’s unambiguous language of revocation accurately reflected 
her intent.292 The higher court found the evidence of intent to be 
“at least evenly balanced.”293 Thus “even taking into 
consideration that the trial court saw and heard the testimony of 
witnesses,”294 the court on appeal reversed the lower court’s 
decision finding that the trust was not revoked.295 This approach 
seems entirely consistent with the mistake correction reform, 
which counsels caution against reformation unless the mistake is 
proven to a high degree of confidence—confidence that is more 
difficult to attain if the evidence is truly mixed. 
Some of the appellate cases contain statements that seem at 
odds with the reformers’ concept of appellate review, even where 
                                                                                                     
 292. See In re Isvik, 741 N.W.2d 638, 648 (Neb. 2007) (analyzing whether a 
letter signed and mailed by the settlor to the Bank, which unambiguously stated 
that she was revoking her trust, was actually intended only to discharge the 
Bank as trustee, and therefore the revocable trust should be subject to 
reformation based upon mistake). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See id. (concluding that “the county court erred in reforming the 
unambiguous written notice of revocation which Isvik submitted to the 
trustee”). 
IRRESOLUTE TESTATORS 59 
the outcomes do not. In Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella 
Trust,296 Kathryn Purcella sought in 2010 to reform an 
irrevocable trust she had created in 2009, arguing that the trust 
instrument did not conform to her original intent.297 Multiple 
witnesses—including one of her children, a daughter-in-law, and 
two different lawyers—testified that Kathryn “understood the 
effect of the trust at the time it was executed.”298 The court below 
found these witnesses’ testimony “more credible than 
Kathryn’s,”299 and thus denied the reformation. The appellate 
court affirmed, stating: “Because we give deference to the 
superior court’s credibility determinations, the fact that 
Kathryn’s testimony contradicted the testimony of these other 
witnesses is not a sufficient basis for finding clear error.”300 
Again, the outcome seems entirely consistent with the 
reformation statute; if the evidence conflicts, it is not “clear and 
convincing.” Yet the appellate court’s talk of deference seems 
inconsistent with the idea of “rigorous” review. Had the lower 
court found Kathryn’s testimony to be more credible than the 
other witnesses, would the appellate court have deferred to that 
factual finding, and upheld a trust reformation even though the 
evidence conflicted? 
The same question arises in Reid v. Sonder.301 Here, Sonder’s 
trust, to be funded by a pour-over from his testate estate, 
provided that “after giving effect” to enumerated charitable gifts, 
his nurse Cecilia Reid was to receive a cash gift of $25,000 and 
Sonder’s apartment.302 There were insufficient funds to pay all 
the gifts, and thus if Reid’s gift was truly to take effect only after 
the charities were paid, she would not receive the apartment.303 
Reid petitioned for reformation, arguing that Sonder did not 
intend this result, notwithstanding the trust’s explicit terms.304 
                                                                                                     
 296. 325 P.3d 987 (Alaska 2014). 
 297. See id. at 991 (claiming misrepresentations in regard to the “nature 
and purpose of the documents [that] she signed”). 
 298. Id. at 992. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. 63 So. 3d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 302. See id. at 9 (setting out the provisions of the trust). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 9–10. 
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The trial court denied the reformation, and the appellate court 
affirmed.305 It stated that “it is not our function to conduct a de 
novo review of the evidence, but simply to determine whether 
there exists in the record competent substantial evidence to 
support the judgment by the trial court.”306 This standard held 
even though the standard of proof on the reformation issue was 
“clear and convincing evidence.”307 The court described the 
interaction of the two standards as follows: 
In denying the petition for reformation, the probate court 
necessarily determined Reid did not meet her burden of 
proving the allegations of the petition by clear and convincing 
evidence. In civil cases prosecuted under this standard, “an 
appellate court may not overturn a trial court’s finding 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence unless the finding is 
unsupported by record evidence, or as a matter of law, no one 
could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and 
convincing.”308 
One judge vigorously dissented on the reformation issue, 
adducing seven pages’ worth of evidence that Sonder absolutely 
wanted Reid to take the apartment regardless of what the 
charities took.309 In the dissenting judge’s view, the evidence was 
indeed clear and convincing that Sonder would have wanted his 
trust reformed.310 Had the probate court taken this view, the 
appellate court would have been obliged to affirm.  
As in Purcella, the lower court in Sonder was cautious about 
reforming unambiguous terms where there was conflicting 
evidence about the settlor’s intent.311 Under these circumstances, 
                                                                                                     
 305. Id. at 11.  
 306. Id. at 10 (citations omitted). 
 307. Id.  
 308. Id. (quoting McKesson Drug Co. v. Williams, 706 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis added). 
 309. See id. at 11–18 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that the majority’s “conclusion not only renders superfluous section 
736.0415 but ignores the record as well”). 
 310. See id. at 18 (“[B]ecause it was proved by clear and convincing evidence 
that both the accomplishment of the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust 
were affected by a drafting mistake . . . the reformation sought should have been 
granted.”). 
 311. See id. at 10 (majority opinion) (concluding that the record was not so 
clear as to allow for judicial reformation of the will). 
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deferential standards of appellate review will not disrupt the 
operation of the reform, under which the status quo is 
maintained unless there is a high degree of certainty that a 
mistake has been made. But where the evidence is mixed, 
reasonable trial courts can reasonably reach divergent 
conclusions about the credibility of witnesses and the weight of 
the evidence. Thus it is not impossible for a trial court to 
determine, on mixed evidence, that the evidence supporting a 
proposed reformation is clear and convincing. If the appellate 
courts stick by their statements about deferring to the trial court 
determinations of fact, it is unclear how seriously they will 
scrutinize these lower court decisions. This is hardly the rigorous 
policing of the clear and convincing evidence standard that the 
drafters of the reform prescribed. 
While some scholars have suggested, consistent with the 
reformers, that the clear and convincing evidence standard 
should lead to a more searching level of appellate scrutiny,312 it is 
hardly surprising that a wills law reform provision has not 
generally altered longstanding rules regarding appellate review. 
These rules allocate decision-making authority based on the 
relative institutional competence of trial and appellate courts and 
on considerations of efficiency.313 Presumably these factors are as 
pertinent to litigation over wills as to any other area of litigation. 
Thus, it is not realistic to expect that appellate scrutiny will push 
lower courts to be more careful about their fact finding.  
However, as is true with respect to the lower courts’ 
somewhat casual application of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard, the cases on appeal do not as a general matter feel 
particularly controversial, but they do not feel typical either. 
Neither Purcella nor Reid involved the dropped paragraph or 
misdescribed donee paradigmatic under the mistake correction 
reform. The settlor in Purcella appears simply to have changed 
                                                                                                     
 312. See generally, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 50(a): Rationing and 
Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 
655 (1988); Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 KAN. 
L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1991). 
 313. See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the 
Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 444–47 (2004) (outlining and 
critiquing traditional rationales for appellate court deference). 
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her mind about the terms of the trust she created.314 The 
comments to Restatement section 12.1 specifically address this 
situation, stating that reformation is not available “to modify a 
document in order to give effect to the donor’s post-execution 
change of mind . . . or to compensate for other changes in 
circumstances.”315 The facts—and the mistake—in Reid are more 
complicated, involving a technical drafting problem whose 
significance did not become clear until the lower court interpreted 
the language of the trust.316 This was not the classic scrivener’s 
error that misrendered the testator’s wishes, but rather a case 
where the settlor never formed a wish pertaining to the choice 
that ultimately had to be made among gifts.317 Because the facts 
of the cases depart from the reform statute’s model, the lower 
courts in these cases, unlike the courts in Kuralt and Ehrlich, 
declined to intervene. Under these circumstances, the deferential 
standard of review seems beside the point. It is where the lower 
courts stretch to remedy mistakes outside the paradigm of the 
reforms that the deferential standard of review might make the 
most difference. In these cases, the extent of appellate court 
deference will determine in part whether testators who do not fit 
the reforms’ model—because they never reached a final decision, 
or because they changed their mind—will be protected. 
                                                                                                     
 314. See Purcella v. Purcella Tr., 325 P.3d 987, 991–95 (Alaska 2014) 
(reciting the facts of the case). 
 315. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 12.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015). On post-creation changes in circumstances, 
see Morey v. Everbank, 93 So. 3d 482, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(“[D]eterioration in the decedent’s financial circumstances between the time he 
executed estate planning documents and the date of death . . . did not constitute 
a ‘mistake’ requiring reformation of trust documents.”). 
 316. As the court below construed the trust, by including the $25,000 cash 
gift in the same paragraph as the gift of the apartment, the attorney made the 
entire gift to Reid subject to abatement. Reid v. Sonder, 63 So. 3d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
 317. While there was little dispute that the settlor wished that Reid receive 
his apartment, it was not clear that the settlor even considered the possibility 
that the trust would lack sufficient cash to cover all the designated gifts. Id. at 
10–11. 
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IV. Implications 
When we see a will that is properly executed, we tend to 
assume that it was truly intended by the testator. But we could 
be wrong. The testator might have lacked mental capacity,318 or 
the apparent will might have been written as a joke or 
stratagem.319 Conversely, when we see a will that is not properly 
executed, we think we know that the decedent did not intend the 
document to serve as his will. But here again we could be wrong. 
The decedent might not have understood that, for example, his 
signature needed to be observed by two witnesses or that the two 
witnesses needed to see each other sign. Or the decedent’s lawyer 
may have failed to competently supervise the will’s execution. 
How confident must we be about the mistake before we 
correct the error? In the case of the apparently-improper will, the 
answer built into the will execution and mistake correction 
reforms is “very confident.” Proof of the testator’s intent in these 
cases can only be based on evidence extrinsic to the will, evidence 
that the decedent cannot rebut or correct. This evidence is 
thought in most instances to be inherently unreliable and 
dangerous. Thus, before steps are taken to correct apparent 
errors, the evidence of the testator’s intent must be “clear and 
convincing.” But if the objective of the clear and convincing 
evidence standard is to provide reliability, the case law to date is 
a bit discouraging. Courts do not consistently demand all that 
much in the way of proof. 
In this Part of the Article, I consider the reforms in light of 
the conventionally-accepted objective of wills law, which is to 
carry out individuals’ wishes with respect to the disposition of 
their property at death. I first evaluate the reforms’ effect on the 
safe harbor function of wills, assessing why incentives that are 
used in other areas of law to produce clarity ex ante might not 
                                                                                                     
 318. On the requirement of mental capacity, see generally DUKEMINIER & 
SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 266–74; 1–12 SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS 
§ 12.17 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015). 
 319. See Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499, 499 (Mass. 1904) (presenting a 
situation in which a will was executed allegedly for the purpose of inducing the 
beneficiary to sleep with the testator); Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of 
Wills, supra note 38, at 542 n.75 (describing “wills” executed as part of Masonic 
order initiation ceremonies). 
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work for wills. I then question whether the safe harbor accurately 
describes all testators’ will-making processes. As it turns out, 
wills law acknowledges two rather different testamentary selves, 
one who is capable of unambiguous, once and for all decision 
making, and another who is distinctively less self-reliant in 
making his wishes clear. These two selves implicate somewhat 
divergent views of testamentary freedom. The clear and 
convincing evidence standard is meant to mediate between these 
selves and these views. Not surprisingly, it has not been 
altogether effective in doing so. 
A. Safe Harbors 
Let us return to the reforms’ premise: it is only human to err. 
Testators, as well as their attorneys, sometimes will hash up a 
will’s execution, include a mistaken term, or omit an intended 
provision. These mistakes are often of trivial import and obvious. 
Rather than pretending that an error was not made, the law can 
forgive it.320 But to ensure that the law does not entirely give up 
on the functionalism of form, it will attend only to errors of a 
certain kind: “innocuous,” “innocent,” “harmless” errors. And 
these errors must be proved by evidence that is “clear and 
convincing.” 321 The will-execution and mistake-correction reforms 
function as limited exceptions to otherwise-adequate general 
principles. They are not meant to change the requirements for a 
valid will, but simply provide a mechanism to prevent 
meaningless blunders from defeating a testator’s convincingly 
evidenced intent. 
This formulation fits into established tropes with which we 
think about other legal fields. The requirements for due execution 
of wills and the doctrines precluding extrinsic evidence of intent 
are rules. Either a will is signed or it is not; either it is witnessed 
by the specified number of witnesses or it is not; either its words 
accurately reflect the testator’s wishes or they do not.322 These 
                                                                                                     
 320. See supra Part II.A (discussing the logical underpinning of the 
harmless error doctrine). 
 321. See supra Part II.B (discussing the reasoning behind the harmless error 
doctrine and the standards courts use in applying it). 
 322. On rules and standards, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
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rules make best sense ex ante, when the objective is to encourage 
the testator to provide the clearest, most reliable possible 
evidence of his desires.323 But rules will be rules, always overly 
broad or narrow, and they operate indiscriminately, invalidating 
intended alongside unintended wills.324 Post hoc, fact and 
circumstance based adjustments are needed. These are provided 
by the reforms, which operate as standards;325 they do not 
prescribe the facts that will establish that the testator intended 
the document to serve as a will or that the terms of the will are 
mistaken.326 Standards allow us to look at a wider universe of 
facts and to achieve results more equitable than the rules 
permit.327  
Ordinarily the ex ante/ex post framework addresses 
incentives.328 Rules operating ex ante, like the Wills Act 
                                                                                                     
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Carol M. 
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Kathleen 
Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 
(1992). 
 323. See generally Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex 
Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2013) [hereinafter 
Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom] (enumerating ex ante considerations 
relevant to the exercise of testamentary freedom); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 961 (1995) (“The key characteristic 
of rules is that they attempt to specify outcomes before particular cases arise. 
Rules are largely defined by the ex ante character of law.”). 
 324. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 
YALE L.J. 65, 70 (1983) (describing the over- and under-inclusiveness of rules); 
Kennedy, supra note 322, at 1689 (same); see also Sunstein, supra note 323, at 
1022 (“Because of their ex ante character, rules will usually be overinclusive and 
underinclusive with reference to the arguments that justify them.”). 
 325. See Sullivan, supra note 322, at 66 (stating that standards “spare 
individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules”). 
 326. See Sunstein, supra note 323, at 965 (“With a standard, it is not 
possible to know what we have in advance.”). 
 327. While the reforms do not specify which facts must be proven to show a 
document was intended to be a will or a term is mistaken, they also do not seem 
to envision an all-things-considered type of analysis. As noted earlier, Uniform 
Probate Code section 2-503 requires a showing that the decedent intended “the 
document or writing” to constitute his will, and Uniform Probate Code section 
2-805 requires evidence of “what the transferor’s intention was and that the 
terms of the governing instrument were affected by a mistake.” UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). The analysis is not 
meant to be holistic. 
 328. See Rose, supra note 322, at 591 (describing how the ex ante 
perspective encourages consideration of matters “from the perspective of persons 
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execution rules, are incentives for clear thinking, clear exposition, 
and clear authentication. If it is determined that an issue is best 
addressed ex ante, then rule violations are generally not excused, 
lest we weaken the incentives that led to the adoption of the ex 
ante rule in the first place.329 On this reasoning, the automatic-
invalidity rule for noncompliant wills seems appropriate.330 
If we take this view, the kind of free-ranging, 
all-things-considered analysis of a case such as Ehrlich is 
troubling because it threatens the safe harbor function of wills.331 
The forces that conspire against will making are strong; 
                                                                                                     
similar to the parties at the outset of their relationship, and then figure out how 
we want them to think and act before all contingencies become realities”). 
 329. See id. at 592 
To put it baldly, the ex ante perspective generally means sticking it to 
those who fail to protect themselves in advance against contingencies 
that, as it happens, work out badly for them. No muddiness here. All 
parties are presumed to be clear-sighted overseers of their own best 
interests; it is up to them to tie up all the loose ends that they can, 
and the courts should let the advantages and disadvantages fall 
where they may. Why? Because this will encourage people to plan 
and to act carefully, knowing that no judicial cavalry will ride to their 
rescue later. 
 330. Glover, Decoupling, supra note 24, at 625 (“[T]he rule of strict 
compliance encourages those who desire to distribute their property through 
wills to comply with the prescribed will-execution formalities.”); see also STERK, 
supra note 210, at 228 (“[T]he mysteries created by the formalities channel 
testators to lawyers, who are trained in . . . preparing wills.”). 
 331. See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring 
and Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 438 (2001) (“[P]reservation of a safe 
harbor is essential to a will reformation doctrine.”); Glover, Decoupling, supra 
note 24, at 620 (“[W]ill formalities form a safe harbor for the exercise of 
testamentary freedom. When testators communicate testamentary intent 
through a written, signed, and attested document, they have assurance that the 
court will recognize her expression of testamentary intent as legally valid.”); 
Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1031 (“[I]f we gave up a will requirement 
or . . . requirement of testamentary intent, we would create an administrative 
nightmare—any evidence would be relevant to show how a decedent would want 
her property distributed. We would remove the finality or safe harbor of a will 
and discourage efficient estate planning.”). 
The “safe harbor” of wills law differs significantly from safe harbors in other 
areas of law, where “a safe harbor describes behavior that will not be penalized, 
and leaves other facts that fall outside the safe harbor to be judged 
case-by-case.” Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613543. For a 
discussion of safe harbors in tax law, see generally Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors 
in Tax Law, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1385 (2015).  
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confronting death, property and family in one simultaneous act is 
not easy. The testator who nonetheless manages in light of these 
forces to formulate and state his wishes may well want them 
protected against subsequent assaults—not only by 
self-interested potential beneficiaries, but from his own post-will 
changes of mind.332 The idea here is that once the testator tells 
his story, he can be confident it will not be altered and that he 
can, as it were, cross off his to-do list the emotionally difficult 
task of providing for post-mortem distribution of probate 
assets.333 The safe harbor protects him from having to state his 
reasons for doing as he did, and from attempts to disrupt his 
well-considered plan.334 Once he has stated his intent, no more 
needs to be—or should be—done. 
If this is an accurate description of wills, then the old 
automatic-invalidity and no-extrinsic-evidence rules have clear 
advantages. While in some cases they will indeed defeat intent, 
they nonetheless prevent litigation that many testators might 
find quite troubling in their open exploration of the testators’ 
private lives, sexual affairs, or preferences among friends and 
relatives. If the point of making a will is to prevent 
under-informed guessing about what the testator might have or 
probably wanted, then there is wit to a hard-edged rule that puts 
such questions out of bounds.335 
                                                                                                     
 332. See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in 
Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1047 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hirsch, Default Rules] (describing testators’ peace of mind in knowing that their 
assets will be distributed as they have directed); Orth, supra note 8, at 81 
(“Some objective criteria by which persons may signal their final desires with 
respect to succession to their property are desirable, thus allowing subsequent 
fact-finders to proceed quickly and inexpensively to process their estates.”). 
 333. See Champine, supra note 331, at 435 (“[T]he testator understands that 
he executes the document for the purpose of expressing his wishes. There is no 
reason he would expect an inquiry to occur after death that could change the 
dispositive scheme he adopted.”). 
 334. See Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1031 (“[T]he problem with probate is 
that the person whose wishes we want to implement is dead. She can no longer 
speak. In a system without the safe harbor of a will, a testator might have to go 
to extraordinary lengths to ensure that her wishes were followed after her 
death.”).  
 335. For further commentary on whether a relaxation of Wills Act 
formalities, specifically the adoption of the harmless error rule, actually results 
in a reduction in the number of “valid” wills being denied probate due to 
noncompliance with required formalities, see generally Orth, supra note 8, at 
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In wills cases, however, the line of reasoning that focuses on 
incentives seems to fit imperfectly.336 The contracting party who 
fails to put his agreement in writing where the Statute of Frauds 
so requires will learn from the invalidity of his contract to get it 
in writing next time. However, testators do not get a second 
chance; they learn nothing from the invalidation of their wills.337 
Perhaps other potential will-makers will hear what happened to 
their unfortunate acquaintance, and the Wills Act incentives will 
operate for them—or send them scurrying to a (competent) 
lawyer. But this may not be very likely.338 Or perhaps the 
incentive is addressed to the lawyer. Yet this, too, is questionable 
because apart from the prospect of malpractice liability or 
reputational loss, she is not punished if a will fails due to 
improper execution. It is not her dispositive wishes that will be 
defeated. Adding to the complexity is the potential unjust 
enrichment to unintended beneficiaries if “harmless” mistakes 
are not corrected.339 
The reforms appear to seek a legal middle ground. They 
allow consideration of only a narrow range of mistakes—those 
involving efforts to enter the safe harbor—and only where failure 
is proven to a high degree of certainty via the clear and 
convincing evidence standard. They assume that testators have 
formed a fixed intent, and address only the problem of 
inadvertent errors in setting out those wishes in the will or 
properly executing the completed document. Read literally, the 
                                                                                                     
80–81. 
 336. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 618 (1992) (suggesting that facilitative rules such as those 
governing will execution do not fit easily into the ex ante/ex post framework). 
 337. Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary 
Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 634 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Text and 
Time] (“[E]state planning is a one-time (or at best infrequent) activity.”); Hirsch, 
Default Rules, supra note 332, at 1041 (describing how testators are “mortals 
who, as such, can only die once” and thus may not incur the information costs 
necessary to learn inheritance rules). 
 338. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 332, at 1055 (asserting that the 
rules of intestacy are “relatively obscure” and expressing doubt that people 
outside the decedent’s family would know whether a transfer occurred via 
intestacy as opposed to an estate plan). 
 339. On the importance of preventing unjust enrichment, see generally 
Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 524–25, 572–77, 
590. 
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reforms preclude, as did prior law, inquiry into broad questions of 
dispositive intent.340 
As we have seen, sometimes courts have found it difficult to 
stay within the limits written into the reforms, and the clear and 
convincing evidence standard has not prevented them from 
crossing the lines. But that may be less about the courts than 
about testators themselves, many of whose will making does not 
seem to conform to the safe harbor paradigm.341 Testators often 
stray from the safe harbors they created in earlier wills, 
scribbling changes on the document itself, preparing new 
documents whose connection with their wills is unclear, or 
otherwise indicating changed views. 
Much of the scholarship assessing the possible effects of the 
harmless error and mistake correction reforms assumes that 
these non-conforming testators will be people with relatively low 
levels of either sophistication or resources, or both. Well-to-do 
testators, presumably better informed than those with fewer 
resources, will consult attorneys,342 who, in turn, will only 
endeavor harder to avoid litigation.343 It is less affluent testators, 
who cannot afford good (or any) estate planning who will cobble 
up their wills at home or scribble their intentions in holographic 
documents that may or may not be meant to have legal effect.344 
                                                                                                     
 340. Langbein specifically considered the safe harbor function of wills and 
clearly did not mean to undermine it. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, 
supra note 10, at 4, 70. 
 341. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 332, at 1047–50 (describing 
resistance to estate planning). 
 342. See Glover, The Therapeutic Function, supra note 77, at 173 (expressing 
concern that “a rule of relaxed formalism could encourage testators to execute 
wills informally and without the assistance of a lawyer”); Guzman, supra note 
153, at 353 (arguing that “nebulous” standards for determining testamentary 
intent “more likely [affect] the holographic will and, thus, testators who are less 
educated, with . . . less wealth or ability to visit lawyers”); Hirsch, Default Rules, 
supra note 332, at 1051 (“[A]ssorted studies have all found a pronounced 
correlation between wealth and testation—the more prosperous one’s 
circumstances, the likelier one is to execute a will.”). 
 343. See supra notes 56–57 (describing how draftsmen will strive to avoid 
litigation). 
 344. See Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, supra note 114, at 1426 
(“[I]ncompleteness [in wills] typically stems from planning errors, often 
encountered in wills produced by lay drafters[, who tend to be] testators of 
lesser means.”); see also Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 17–18 (“When 
an estate-planning lawyer prepares a will, donative testamentary intent is 
70 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2016) 
The case law challenges these assumptions. In Kuralt, Hall, 
and Herceg, the testators all had access to—and at some point in 
the testation process actually used—attorneys.345 Nor did these 
testators, especially Kuralt, lack means. The problem seems to be 
broader than lack of resources, experience, or good advice. 
B. Testamentary Freedom and the Selves of Wills Law 
Underneath the old, unforgiving rules of wills law and the 
reforms lie two somewhat discordant visions of testamentary 
freedom and of the self who makes a will. Courts and 
commentators alike agree that, with but a few exceptions related 
to family protection, the goal of wills law is to carry out the 
wishes of the testator.346 In this view, will making is an exercise 
of freedom of choice; the testator decides what is to be done with 
his property. The testator envisioned here, the one making 
choices, is rational in something like the manner presumed by 
traditional law and economics literature. He is autonomous, 
capable of making for himself the testamentary decisions that 
advance his self-determined aims, whatever those aims might be 
(and they are not for others to judge).347 A testator capable of 
                                                                                                     
rarely an issue[, but holographs,] typically drafted by lawmen without the aid of 
an attorney . . . lack cogent drafting that clearly evinces the testator’s intent to 
make gifts that become effective at death.”). 
 345. Indeed, one of the saddest aspects of teaching strict-compliance and 
no-reformation rule cases is that so many of them involve instruments prepared 
by lawyers. See generally, e.g., In re Groffman, [1969] 1 WLR 733 (PD), 1969 WL 
26902 (attorney failed to supervise execution ceremony); In re Will of Ranney, 
589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991) (attorneys erroneously believed that a signature on 
the self-proving affidavit obviated the need for the testator to sign the will 
itself); Conn. Junior Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 448 A.2d 190 (Conn. 1982) 
(attorney inserted incorrect charitable beneficiaries, using an outdated will). 
 346. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 13, at 2 (“[O]ne fundamental 
proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the individualistic 
institution of private property and granting to the owner the power to determine 
his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor 
giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power.”); see also Adam J. Hirsch 
& William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5–
18 (1992) (surveying the reasons conventionally thought to justify testamentary 
freedom); Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom, supra note 323, at 1133–38 
(same). 
 347. For arguments that we do, however, judge, especially in the context of 
mental capacity, see generally Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity and 
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making these choices is also capable of learning and following the 
rules of will execution—or of consulting an attorney who can 
properly guide him. Similarly, he is capable of saying what he 
means in his will, and meaning what he says. He will make no 
errors in signing his will because he is anxious to put his intent 
beyond question. For the same reason, he will clearly and 
unambiguously state his wishes; that is the very point of the 
will-making enterprise. This testator is deciding once and for all; 
he seeks the safe harbor. Once he enters it, he needs no further 
help from the law because he has been self-reliant and has 
protected himself. For this person, the automatic invalidity rule 
and the no extrinsic evidence rule are appropriate. More 
accurately, because this testator’s will is properly executed and 
unambiguously written, the invalidity and evidentiary rules are 
irrelevant. 
But wills law recognizes another self and another view of 
testamentary freedom. Consider just a few common situations 
that can disrupt the most rational, well-considered estate plans:  
a beneficiary named in a will dies before the testator, the testator 
divorces the spouse named as a beneficiary in his will, or a child 
is born after the will is executed.348 The self-determining, 
self-reliant testator would revise his estate plan in response to 
these events by writing a new will or preparing a codicil, and we 
could have rules that would in effect require such vigilance by 
letting the estate plan misfire if the testator failed to make a 
revision.349 But we do not. Every state has a statutory scheme 
that names a substitute taker for the deceased devisee,350 revokes 
testamentary gifts to divorced spouses,351 and provides a share 
                                                                                                     
Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1987); Leslie, supra note 5. 
 348. All of these have in common that they involve events arising after the 
will has been executed and reveal the effect on wills of the passage of time. See 
generally Hirsch, Text and Time, supra note 337. 
 349. See id. at 625 n.81 (noting that diligent testators will revise estate 
plans); id. at 630 (“[W]hether lawmakers should update an estate 
plan . . . where the testator has not lifted a finger to amend the will is ultimately 
the most interesting . . . question we have before us.”). 
 350. These rules are “anti-lapse” rules. For an example, see DEL. CODE ANN. 
TIT. 12, § 2313 (West 2015). 
 351. For a typical revocation on divorce statute, see FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 732.507(1) (West 2007) (“Any provision of a will executed by a married person 
that affects the spouse of that person shall become void upon the divorce of that 
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for a “pretermitted” child.352 These rules contemplate a different 
self. The testator here, the one who takes no steps to protect his 
own estate plan, is rational in the more complicated manner 
described by recent behavioral law and economics literature. This 
testator, however self-determining and self-reliant he might have 
been at the pre-will stage, is, post-will, fallible and vulnerable. 
Perhaps due to the changes in circumstances he is emotional; 
perhaps he is just inattentive. Wills law could require him to be 
more deliberate and self-determining in exercising his 
testamentary freedom, as it could require him to protect himself, 
but it does not. Rather, it tolerates his errors and shields his 
estate from the consequences of his failures. 
This tolerance extends beyond failures to keep wills updated. 
The principle falsa demonstratio non nocet (mere erroneous 
description does not vitiate) allows courts simply to disregard 
certain mistaken terms, such as incorrect house numbers, that 
are inessential to the devise at hand.353 The doctrine of dependent 
relative revocation protects a testator who revokes his earlier will 
based on a mistaken belief that he has executed a new, valid will 
by permitting probate of the earlier, apparently-revoked will in 
lieu of intent-defeating intestacy.354 In the case of “secret trusts,” 
courts permit admission of extrinsic evidence to prove that a 
seemingly-absolute devise was made based on the devisee’s 
promise to hold the property in trust.355 These are all preventable 
                                                                                                     
person or upon the dissolution or annulment of the marriage.”).  
 352. For a typical pretermitted child statute, see NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30-2321 (West 2014). 
 353. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Arnheiter, 125 A.2d 914, 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1956) (describing how a testator devised her interest in “No. 304 Harrison 
Avenue, Harrison, New Jersey,” but owned No. 317 on that same street and 
allowing a devise of testator’s interest in “premises known as Harrison Avenue, 
Harrison, New Jersey”). 
 354. See generally DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 229–34; 2-21 
SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 21.57 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 
2015). Sometimes intestacy may come closer than the earlier will to 
approximating the testator’s intent. For discussion of this problem, see generally 
George E. Palmer, Dependent Relative Revocation and its Relation to Relief for 
Mistake, 69 MICH. L. REV. 989, 998–99 (1971); Richard F. Storrow, Dependent 
Relative Revocation: Presumption or Probability?, 48 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
L.J. 497, 508–09 (2014). 
 355. Some courts allow extrinsic evidence also in the case of the “semi-secret 
trust,” where the will indicates that the devisee is to hold the property as 
trustee, but does not describe the trust beneficiary. On secret and semi-secret 
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mistakes, and we could say that those who make them deserve to 
have their wishes defeated because they have not taken sufficient 
care in preparing their wills. But again we do not. Preventing 
unjust enrichment is one part of the story, but another part has 
to do with acceptance of the propensity to err. 
Some of the bungled execution and interpretation cases seem 
to involve this erring testator. In variations of Kuralt’s situation, 
they write letters or other documents that gesture toward the 
wills they are going to make—but they do not quite make them. 
Or they execute wills with ambiguous terms; they don’t say what 
they mean or mean what they say. They seem tentative or 
ambivalent. They cannot quite bring themselves to the 
once-and-for-all decisional closure that would allow them to enter 
the safe harbor. Or, in other cases, involving what might be—but 
aren’t clearly—alterations to a valid will, they do not stick to 
their previously made decisions. For these testators, the 
automatic invalidity and no-extrinsic-evidence rules are perilous. 
I do not wish to overdraw the comparison between the two 
testamentary selves. It is surely not the case that some people are 
entirely rational in the traditional, choosing sense, while others 
experience only the bounded rationality of the erring testator. 
Nor is it true that careful, self-reliant testators will never make 
mistakes, while less careful testators will always make them. 
Still, the typology can be helpful in understanding the larger 
objectives of the reforms—and particularly the use of the clear 
and convincing evidence standard. 
Clarity, efficiency, and intent-effectuation would all be 
easiest to attain were all testamentary selves conventionally 
rational and self-reliant. The will would literally speak for itself. 
One way of understanding the automatic-invalidity and 
no-extrinsic-evidence rules is as efforts to turn potentially-erring 
selves into self-reliant ones. But for reasons we have seen—the 
dead do not learn, nor do others learn from their experience—the 
strategy has been ineffectual.356 
                                                                                                     
trusts, see generally DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 433; 5-40 
SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 40.13 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 
2015).  
 356. See Kennedy, supra note 322, at 1699 (“If the argument for rules is to 
work, we must anticipate that private parties will in fact respond to the threat 
of the sanction of nullity by learning to operate the system. But real as opposed 
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How might the law extend a bit of mercy to the errant 
testator, without giving up on encouraging at least some 
self-reliance and protecting safe harbors? The reforms draw the 
line at a limited category of “harmless” errors, errors of very 
specific kinds—the errors of testators who have come close to the 
first testamentary model, who have made once-and-for-all 
decisions.357 They then employ the clear and convincing evidence 
standard to ensure that the errors excused are only errors of the 
specified kinds. But it appears that it is difficult to cabin judicial 
sympathy for the erring self to the precisely specified categories. 
And this is why it is not surprising to see the cases slip from the 
narrow range of errors specified in the statute to the broader 
range of issues raised by cases like Kuralt and Ehrlich.358 
*     *      *      * 
Years of applying the automatic invalidity and no-extrinsic 
evidence rules have been ineffectual at changing erring selves 
into self-reliant selves. While the rhetoric and some of the reality 
of wills law has always emphasized the rational, choosing self for 
whom wills rules are a means for furthering self-determined 
ends, other parts of wills law protect the emotional, ambivalent 
self, who for whom wills rules are not a path for self-actualization 
and, in some cases, may only impede it. Both selves are a part of 
wills law.359 If wills law were concerned only with the line 
between determinate rules and fact-sensitive adjudication, the 
clear and convincing evidence standard might serviceably address 
the problem.360 But the divergence between the self-reliant 
choosing self and the erring irresolute self—the self that cannot 
                                                                                                     
to hypothetical legal actors may be unwilling or unable to do this.”). 
 357. The commentary makes clear that not all errors will or should be 
corrected. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining that reformation is 
not available “to modify a document in order to give effect to the donor’s 
post-execution change of mind” or “to compensate for other changes in 
circumstances” such as an asset’s loss of value after the will’s execution).  
 358. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Kuralt and Ehrlich cases). 
 359. Cf. Rose, supra note 322, at 593 (suggesting that the law oscillates 
between crystals and mud rather than choosing between them). 
 360. But see Sherwin, supra note 8, at 476 (arguing that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is not a compromise but “simply a choice to 
promote accuracy at some expense to the various benefits of formality rules”). 
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bring itself to choose—is not a divergence that is evidentiary in 
nature. Because wills law embraces not only the choosing self but 
also the erring self, the clear and convincing evidence standard 
has not, and will not, function as a serious limit on mistake 
correction. 
V. Conclusion 
The reforms to wills law’s musty will-execution and 
no-reformation rules were meant as technical fixes to 
long-recognized technical problems. Lest anyone worry that 
large-scale change was intended, the reforms permit correction 
only of a narrow universe of technical defects and require that 
those defects be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
Examination of the case law applying the clear and 
convincing evidence standard shows that it has been difficult to 
cabin the reforms to the specific technical errors that the 
reformers had in mind. This slippage demonstrates the limitation 
of thinking about wills entirely in technical terms. For at least 
some testators some of the time, will making is not the process 
postulated by the traditional rhetoric of free testation, a process 
of once-and-for-all self-determining choice. Rather, it is a more 
tentative, ambivalent, on-going process in which closure is hard 
to attain. Wills law is pulled in opposing directions, 
encouraging—but not always demanding—clarity and care. 
The courts’ problems applying the clear and convincing 
evidence standard derive in great measure from the difficult facts 
with which the courts must deal. The very different testamentary 
selves that the law currently recognizes make and change their 
wills in very different ways. A true reform of wills law requires 
open acknowledgement and embrace of these differences. 
